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I. INTRODUCTION
Though the question of whether oral sex is sex was once the subject of
considerable legal controversy, 2 it may seem beyond dispute that student reli-
gious speech is speech. And so it is in one sense: almost no one would disagree
with the proposition that student religious speech counts as speech for First
Amendment purposes and that it is protected by the Free Speech Clause. In
saying that student religious speech is speech, however, I mean something more.
My claim is that student religious speech should be protected only as speech,
and not as the free exercise of religion.
Professor Bowman and I agree that courts and lawyers tend to focus on
the Free Speech Clause in litigation about student religious expression, and we
agree that it is the Free Speech Clause that does the "heavy lifting" in the work
I Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law. I thank Kristi Bowman for
helping me to think about these matters through her own paper and for helpful comments on this
one. I also thank Robert Bastress for his comments; Kevin Ku and Meghan Phillips for research
assistance; Mary Claire Johnson, Meg Parker, and John Rayburn for editorial assistance; and the
Hodges Foundation for its financial support of this project. All errors are mine.
2 See Richard Lacayo, When is Sex Not "Sexual Relations"?, TIME, Aug. 24, 1998, at 38
(discussing President Clinton's assertion that oral sex does not constitute "sexual relations").
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of protecting religious speech in the public schools. If our positions differ, the
difference is that I would go further than she does in insisting not only that the
Free Speech Clause provides the only protection that most student religious
speech does enjoy, but also that it provides the only protection that most student
religious speech should enjoy. To my mind, the judicial focus on free speech in
the sorts of cases discussed by Professor Bowman is not solely a matter of con-
tingent litigation strategy, but also a matter of constitutional principle.
Professor Bowman concentrates on the issues raised by students wear-
ing T-shirts imprinted with provocative, religiously motivated messages. Typi-
cal messages include statements condemning homosexuality or abortion as im-
moral or criticizing other religious traditions.4 Such T-shirts raise problems for
school administrators because the shirts may undermine school goals (e.g., the
promotion of attitudes of tolerance and acceptance toward gay students), deeply
offend and even threaten some students, or simply contribute to controversy and
ill feeling that might distract students from learning the lessons the school is
trying to teach. It is understandable why school administrators would not wel-
come this sort of expression with open arms, and even why they might move to
suppress it if given the authority to do so. On the other side of the equation,
3 Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students' Religious Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination,
110 W. VA. L. REV. 187,190 (2007).
4 See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing T-
shirt that read "Be Ashamed, Our School Embraced What God Has Condemned" on the front and
"Homosexuality is Shameful 'Romans 1:27"' on the back), cert. granted, judgment vacated, case
remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007); Zamecnik ex rel. Zamec-
nik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., No. 07 C 1586, 2007 WL 1141597, at *2 (N.D. I11. Apr. 17, 2007)
(discussing T-shirt that read "Be Happy, Not Gay"); Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 967 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (discussing T-shirt that read "Intolerant/Jesus said...
I am the way, the truth, and the life./ John 14:6" on the front and "Homosexuality is a sin!/Islam is
a lie!/Abortion is murder!/Some issues are just black and white!" on the back).
Professor Bowman's analysis has implications that go beyond T-shirt speech, of course, but
she points to a variety of reasons why cases involving religious T-shirt speech pose the general
constitutional issues in an especially sharp way. Bowman, supra note 3, at 199-201. I would add
that litigation about student T-shirts may be especially common because messages on T-shirts are
both more likely to be detected by school officials and harder for students to avoid than verbal
remarks outside the classroom. While students who disagree with the message carried on a shirt
are free to avert their eyes, cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (stating that persons
exposed to a jacket inscribed with "Fuck the Draft" in a courthouse corridor "could effectively
avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes"), they cannot sim-
ply leave the school altogether. And while the work of the school day limits opportunities for
students to express verbally their views about homosexuality, abortion, or the Iraq War, a shirt can
broadcast students' preferred messages throughout the school day. For some examples of litiga-
tion involving T-shirts with nonreligious themes, see, e.g., Barber v. Dearborn Public Schools,
286 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849, 860 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (granting preliminary injunction to prevent
school from banning T-shirt bearing a picture of President George W. Bush with a caption reading
"International Terrorist"), and Pyle v. South Hadley School Committee, 861 F. Supp. 157, 158,
170 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding that school could ban T-shirts that read "See Dick Drink. See Dick
Drive. See Dick Die. Don't be a Dick" and "Coed Naked Band: Do It To the Rhythm"), state law
rulings vacated and question certified to Sup. Jud. Ct. of Mass., 55 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1995).
[Vol. 110
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however, stand the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom
of religion. For the student who wears a T-shirt citing Biblical authority for the
proposition that "homosexuality is shameful," wearing the shirt can be both an
act of religious witness and an expression of dissent from the school's official
message. Protecting such countermessages may be important not simply as a
matter of student liberty, but also as a check on school powers of indoctrina-
tion.5 Schools that can silence opposing viewpoints--even in pursuit of worthy
goals-threaten to become "enclaves of totalitarianism.",
6
Questions about how much protection this sort of speech enjoys and
where that protection comes from are both important and interesting. Without
pretending to do justice to her entire discussion, I take Professor Bowman to be
making three principal points. First, she contends that it is the Free Speech
Clause rather than the Free Exercise Clause that provides most of the protection
for religious speech in the public schools.7 Second, she argues that the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Morse v. Frederick 8 basically leaves the status quo
unchanged regarding constitutional protection for student religious speech. 9
Third, Professor Bowman suggests that the Supreme Court's student speech
cases "can be read together as a body of law that permits schools to engage in
limited viewpoint discrimination. . . ."'0 More specifically, she contends that
restricting provocative, religiously motivated T-shirts likely would "involve
viewpoint discrimination"" but that this sort of viewpoint discrimination may
be compatible with the Supreme Court's decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School District.12 In passing, Professor Bowman makes a
5 See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITCS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 224-25 (1983); William G. Buss, School Newspapers, Public Forum, and
the First Amendment, 74 IOWA L. REv. 505, 515 (1989).
6 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
7 Bowman, supra note 3, at 190.
8 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
9 Bowman, supra note 3, at 215-19.
10 Bowman, supra note 3, at 192.
1 Bowman, supra note 3, at 219.
12 393 U.S. 503 (1969). As Professor Bowman points out, supra note 3, at 206-07, courts
uniformly treat T-shirt speech as governed by the Tinker decision so long as the speech cannot be
considered vulgar, lewd, or offensive under Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 683 (1986). Compare, e.g., Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 330-31 (2d Cir. 2006) (evalu-
ating T-shirt that portrayed President George W. Bush as a former drug and alcohol abuser under
Tinker), with Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 159 (D. Mass. 1994) (evaluating
T-shirts including phrases "Don't be a Dick" and "Coed Naked Band" under Fraser), state law
rulings vacated and question certified to Sup. Jud. Ct. of Mass., 55 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1995). It
would rarely be plausible to regard T-shirt speech as "school-sponsored" under Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988). The recent Morse decision apparently leaves
unprotected any student T-shirt that could reasonably be construed as advocating or celebrating
illegal drug use, but this rule affects only a small slice of the student speech universe.
2007]
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fourth important point by suggesting that public forum doctrine is not useful in
assessing most restrictions of student speech during school hours.'
3
Her first point is my main concern here, but I will offer a few reflections
on the latter three points in Part I of the article before turning to that concern. In
Part I1, I begin by explaining why it matters whether religious activity is treated
as speech or as religious exercise for First Amendment purposes. I then explain
how and why courts and litigants have increasingly come to focus on the Free
Speech Clause as the primary protector of religious liberty. In the public
schools, however, free speech protections are sufficiently weakened that one
might expect the Free Exercise Clause to assume greater importance in protect-
ing student religious speech. This is all the more true, I suggest, because of the
pervasive availability in the public school context of arguments invoking the
"hybrid rights exception" to the free exercise doctrine established in Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.14 Yet Pro-
fessor Bowman is correct in her claim that the Free Speech Clause remains the
real workhorse in the protection of student religious speech. I try to explain
why this is so. I first review a variety of reasons why hybrid arguments in gen-
eral, and free speech hybrid arguments in particular, have made little headway
in the courts. I then argue that even a stronger reading of the Free Exercise
Clause than is reflected in current law would make no difference in the amount
of protection afforded to conventionally expressive student religious speech.
This is true because most student religious speech must be characterized as
speech rather than the exercise of religion; and once that characterization is
made, the Free Speech Clause decrees that any preferential treatment of reli-
gious speech in relation to secular speech is unconstitutional content discrimina-
tion. It follows, to restate my thesis, that student religious speech is speech. 15 I
conclude with some tentative reflections on the implications of my analysis for
broader questions about the proper relationship between speech and free exer-
cise protections for religious activity.
13 Bowman, supra note 3, at 199 n.51.
14 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
15 I say this, of course, as an application of the general idea that some religious speech is so
closely analogous to secular speech that it must be analyzed under speech principles forbidding
content-based discrimination in favor of religious speech. The only thing distinctive about student
speech in the context of this argument is that the kinds of speech opportunities available to stu-
dents within the school day environment tend to be conventional forms of expression like wearing
T-shirts, distributing literature, and verbal expression rather than the more complex forms of sym-
bolic speech embodied in religious ritual and prayer. The former sorts of speech must be treated
as speech, the latter need not be. See infra notes 167-175 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 110
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II. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
A. Morse v. Frederick
Regarding Professor Bowman's second point, I agree that Morse adds
little to the existing Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood framework16 for evaluating stu-
16 Professor Bowman, supra note 3, at 201-11, provides a clear summary of the way this
framework is usually understood. Some of the most difficult questions about these cases concern
the proper interpretation of Hazelwood. For example, does Hazelwood turn completely on the
idea that some student speech could reasonably be perceived to carry the imprimatur of the
school? Courts generally seem to reason this way, and sometimes go so far as to say that under
Hazelwood school-sponsored speech simply is the speech of the school. See, e.g., C.H. v. Oliva,
195 F.3d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that Hazelwood cannot be read to require viewpoint
neutrality because it concerns "the school's own speech"), affd in part en banc by an equally
divided court, vacated and remanded in part, 226 F.3d 198, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2000).
This way of thinking, however, is misleading in two ways. First, it obscures an important
distinction between speech that is solely the school's and student speech that is school-sponsored
(and thus is in some sense the speech of both the school and the student). Admittedly, worries
about the thinness of this line and about mistaken attribution of student messages to the school are
one prominent argument for the position that Hazelwood must be read to allow schools to engage
in viewpoint discrimination so they can disassociate themselves from disagreeable or controver-
sial messages. Cf Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1214-17 (11 th Cir.
2004) (holding that under Hazelwood school could remove student painted murals with religious
messages since those messages could easily be attributed to the school); Emily Gold Waldman,
Returning to Hazelwood's Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech,
60 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010383 (justifying the
result in Bannon by suggesting at manuscript page 70 that "[a] reasonable observer is likely to
perceive speech that has been permanently etched on school walls as the school's own, or, at the
very least, as strongly indicative of the school's own views"). Nevertheless, it is far clearer that
the school may engage in viewpoint discrimination with respect to speech that is solely its own
than with respect to student speech that is school-sponsored. See Downs v. Los Angeles Unified
Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000).
Second, reading Hazelwood as limited to the school's own speech is hard to square with the
fact that the case is usually read to cover all student speech that is part of the curriculum (e.g.,
speech in classroom discussions, presentations, or student assignments), see, e.g., Oliva, 195 F.3d
at 174 (evaluating school's refusal to allow elementary school student to read a Bible story in
class under Hazelwood); Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995)
(evaluating school's restrictions on topic for an assigned paper under Hazelwood); Duran v.
Nitsche, 780 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (same), even though a good deal of that speech
could not reasonably be thought to bear the imprimatur of the school, see Oliva, 226 F.3d at 213
(Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that "nothing in Hazelwood suggests that its standard applies when a
student is called upon to express his or her personal views in class or in an assignment"); Settle,
53 F.3d at 157-58 (Batchelder, J., concurring) (suggesting that student's choice to write a paper on
the life of Jesus should not be governed by Hazelwood because "[tihere is no way to make a col-
orable claim that this paper is speech which might be viewed by the community as bearing the
imprimatur of the school").
Perhaps there are good reasons why schools should be allowed to discriminate on the basis
of viewpoint with respect to classroom speech; indeed, it has been suggested that this is an ines-
capable part of the educational process. KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS? 168 (2005) (stating that schools try to instill some viewpoints at the expense of others
and that this aim may be reflected in "viewpoint discriminatory" class assignments such as essays
2007]
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dent speech claims, and that it is perhaps more important for what it did not say
than for what it said. 17  Although Morse allows schools to engage in blatant
viewpoint discrimination against student speech that advocates illegal drug use,
its implications for the issue of viewpoint discrimination in general are (at least
in the short term) quite limited. This is so, I suggest, because Morse creates a
narrow category of low-value speech that encompasses only student advocacy
of illegal drugs, thereby removing that speech from the protection of the First
Amendment. 18 Though the Court does not use the terminology of low-value
speech, this is the reading on which the case makes the most sense.
requiring students to write about, e.g., the value of honesty, respect, or religious liberty); Robert
C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1825 (1987) (stating that viewpoint discrimination is a "regular and un-
avoidable aspect" of the government's efforts to manage speech within the confines of govern-
ment institutions including public schools). But if viewpoint discrimination regarding classroom
and assignment speech is acceptable, it is not because this speech is functionally equivalent to the
school's own speech. For an interesting argument that the permissibility of viewpoint discrimina-
tion under Hazelwood ought to vary with the degree of school sponsorship, see Waldman, supra,
at 64-78.
17 Bowman, supra note 3, at 219-21.
18 Low-value speech is not always completely devoid of constitutional protection, see Jeffrey
M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 331-32 (1995) (explaining
that "definitional balancing" is the principal method the Court uses for protecting speech that has
low value but not the lowest value), but under Morse pro-drug speech in the schools appears
wholly unprotected because the state may restrict such speech on the basis of nothing more than a
finding that the speech could reasonably be understood to advocate illegal drug use.
The whole apparatus of low-value speech is controversial because it necessarily involves
content-based discrimination. It is the speech's content that renders it low in value. R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992). Accordingly, the Supreme Court's willingness to
create a new ad hoc category of low-value speech in Morse does not bode well for its commitment
to principled speech protection in the schools or for the elegance of First Amendment doctrine.
Cf Harry Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 10, 17-19
(objecting to the Court's adoption of a "two-level" approach to the First Amendment in obscenity
cases and warning that it might "have unhappy repercussions on the protection of free speech
generally"). At least for now, however, it is some solace that Morse appears to be a case about
illegal drug use and nothing more. One is tempted to say that the First Amendment has joined the
Fourth as a casualty of the War on Drugs, albeit on a much smaller scale. See, e.g., Gerald G.
Ashdown, The Blueing of America: The Bridge Between the War on Drugs and the War on Ter-
rorism, 67 U. Prrr. L. REV. 753, 755 (2006) ("Considerable privacy interests and civil liberties
were sacrificed to law enforcement during the last three decades of the twentieth century in the
name of the war on drugs."); William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies; 77
VA. L. REV. 881, 942-43 (1991) (explaining that the Supreme Court's reluctance to use warrants
to combat police perjury "might be seen as a movement toward the position most consistent with
aggressive prosecution of drug cases ... [and this] ... may be one of the most important, but least
noticed, ways in which the criminal justice system has been shaped by the needs of the war
against drugs.").
It may also seem odd to talk about advocacy of illegal drug use as being low-value speech
"in the schools," as one might think that speech is either low in value or it is not. But Fraser is
commonly read to treat speech that is lewd or offensive in its manner of expression as low-value
speech in the schools even though such speech enjoys more protection elsewhere. See, e.g., Oliva,
226 F.3d at 211 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that "[in the public schools, low-value speech, such
[Vol. 110
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss1/13
WHY STUDENT RELIGIOUS SPEECH IS SPEECH
Both the Court's opinion and Justice Alito's concurrence try to draw a
link between the school's authority to restrict student speech advocating illegal
drug use and student safety. 9 Their reasoning about the nature of the link is less
than clear, however. If the rationale is that the speech will lead students to use
drugs and thereby jeopardize their safety, one would expect some specific show-
ing that a "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" banner would actually influence student choices,
and nothing approaching such a showing was present in Morse.20 The linkage,
as far as I can discern, is meant to be provided by the Court's claims that peer
pressure is an extraordinarily important influence on student drug use and that a
school's tolerance of pro-drug student messages undermines student belief in
the seriousness of the school's anti-drug commitment and thus contributes to an
atmosphere of pro-drug peer pressure. 2' This line of thought would explain why
a school must have broad authority to restrict student advocacy of illegal drug
use, though one might question whether the majority's premises are compatible
with views some of its Justices have expressed on other occasions.22 But this
as vulgar and offensive language, may be restricted to a greater extent than would otherwise be
permissible"); see also Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007) ("Had Fraser delivered
the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been protected.");
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-83 (1986) (stating that "the First Amend-
ment gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's
jacket" (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir.
1979) (Newman, J., concurring))).
19 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628-29; id. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
20 Id. at 2659 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The notion that the message on this banner would
actually persuade either the average student or even the dumbest one to change his or her behavior
is most implausible."); cf. JOHN MAYER, Belief, on CONTINUUM (Columbia Records 2006) ("Is
there anyone who ever remembers changing their mind from the paint on a sign?"). I would not
wish to overstate John Mayer's contributions to First Amendment theory or to underestimate the
power of political advocacy, but the lyrical observation seems entirely appropriate in relation to a
banner like "Bong Hits 4 Jesus."
21 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (stating that "school boards know that peer pressure is perhaps
'the single most important factor leading schoolchildren to take drugs,' and that students are more
likely to use drugs when the norms in school appear to tolerate such behavior" (quoting Bd. of
Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 840 (2002)
(Breyer, J., concurring))); id. at 2629 (stating that when Frederick unfurled his banner, it was
reasonable for the principal to conclude that "failing to act would send a powerful message to the
students in her charge . . .about how serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug
use").
22 Justice Scalia signed the majority opinion in Morse, yet ridiculed Justice Kennedy's major-
ity opinion in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), for relying so heavily on the notion of peer
pressure. Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between genuine legal coercion and
"ersatz, 'peer-pressure' psycho-coercion"). In fairness, it can be said that perhaps Justice Scalia's
Weisman dissent does not doubt the force or reality of peer pressure itself so much as doubt
whether peer pressure should count as legal coercion by the state for purposes of the Establish-
ment Clause. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Board of Education of Westside Community
Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), states that "[t]he proposition that schools do not endorse
everything they fail to censor is not complicated" and that "secondary students are ... likely to
understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a
nondiscriminatory basis." Id. at 250. Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice Scalia) refrained from
2007]
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peer pressure argument, even if accepted, would not explain every aspect of
Morse. For the Court, and most explicitly for Justices Alito and Kennedy, there
is a key distinction between speech celebrating or advocating illegal drug use
and speech that advocates political change.23 Specifically, the opinions in
Morse imply that "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" (interpreted to mean roughly "Use mari-
juana-even though it is illegal") may be restricted without any specific show-
ing of disruption, but "Legalize Marijuana" may only be restricted if the school
can prove a substantial disruption or an invasion of the rights of others under
Tinker.24 I do not think this is a sensible line to draw if the concern is taking a
hard line against pro-drug peer pressure. To advocate the legalization of mari-
juana or any other drug is to imply that drug use is not so bad or dangerous as
conventional wisdom would suggest; and if tolerance of "Bong Hits 4 Jesus"
signals a lack of commitment in the school's anti-drug message, it is unclear
why tolerance of "Legalize Marijuana" does not do the same thing. The differ-
ence in treatment must be a function of the content of the speech.25 "Legalize
marijuana" is political advocacy, traditionally high-value speech 26; "Bong Hits 4
Jesus" is (at least in the Court's eyes) an incitement to illegal action, tradition-
joining this part of Justice O'Connor's opinion, but expressed no disagreement with these state-
ments. Id. at 258-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
23 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625 (stating that "this is plainly not a case about political debate over
the criminalization of drug use or possession"); id. at 2636 (Alito, J. concurring) (stating that he
joins the majority opinion on the understanding that it "provides no support for any restriction of
speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue," including
issues about the war, on drugs and the merits of legalizing marijuana use). Because this caveat is a
condition for Justice Alito's and Justice Kennedy's votes joining the majority opinion, it arguably
operates as the narrowest ground for the decision in Morse and therefore should be treated as
controlling. Cf. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (announcing the "narrowest
grounds" doctrine for determining the holding of a case where there is no majority opinion). It is
important to appreciate, however, that even if controlling, the Alito concurrence's implications are
relatively narrow. Justice Alito's caveat that the majority opinion "provides no support for any
restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social
issue" simply says that Morse could not justify such restrictions and leaves open the possibility
that the Court's other student speech cases would allow the restriction of speech commenting on
political or social issues. In other words, I think Justice Alito was simply trying to limit the de-
gree to which Morse augments pre-existing school authority to regulate speech, not to cut back on
the authority already present under Tinker, Hazelwood, and Fraser.
24 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring). As explained in the previous note, I take
Justice Alito's concurrence to be controlling on this point.
25 Shaman, supra note 18, at 299, distinguishes between speech restrictions turning on the low
value of the speech and those turning on harms associated with the speech. Despite the rhetorical
appeals to student safety, I think Morse clearly emerges as a low-value speech case if one asks
whether it can plausibly be said that banners advocating illegal marijuana use have a stronger
causal connection to the harms of student drug use than banners calling for the legalization of
marijuana.
26 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion); Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and
Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REv. 203, 207 (1982) ("Perhaps the leading theme in the Su-
preme Court's cases is the primacy of political speech.").
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ally low-value speech.27 The difference in the value of the speech explains why
the Morse Court would provide much more protection for the first message than
for the second.28
B. Viewpoint Discrimination under Tinker
With respect to Professor Bowman's third point about viewpoint dis-
crimination, I would argue that Tinker does not allow schools to engage in pur-
poseful viewpoint discrimination, but does allow schools to regulate substan-
tially disruptive student speech in ways that have viewpoint discriminatory ef-
fects. I develop this position fully in a companion piece to this response, 29 so
what I say here will necessarily be brief to the point of being cryptic. In my
view, the first and most important source of protection for the sort of controver-
sial religious T-shirts discussed by Professor Bowman continues to be the
Tinker test as conventionally understood. Such shirts may only be restricted if
the school can prove substantial disruption or (perhaps30) interference with the
27 Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv.
189, 194-95 (1983) (stating that the Supreme Court treats incitement to unlawful activity as low-
value speech). But see Shaman, supra note 18, at 299 (arguing that Stone is wrong to classify
incitement as low-value speech). Obviously, the Morse standard for what counts as unprotected
"incitement" of illegal drug use in the public schools is vastly less demanding than the usual stan-
dard for incitement. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (stating that the First
Amendment does not allow the state "to forbid or proscribe advocacy of ... law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action"). Morse does not require that advocacy of illegal drug use be likely
to produce such action at all, let alone imminently, see supra note 20 and accompanying text, and
it makes no distinction between express incitement to illegal activity and mere "celebration" of
that activity. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625 (stating that "we discern no meaningful distinction be-
tween celebrating illegal drug use in the midst of fellow students and outright advocacy or promo-
tion"). At least for now, Morse's holding appears to be limited to speech that is "reasonably
viewed as promoting illegal drug use" and does not extend to speech advocating other sorts of
illegal activity. Id.
28 As noted by Professors Bowman and Volokh, there are significant line drawing problems
here since a lot of speech (including, arguably, even the banner in Morse) can be reasonably inter-
preted either as advocating illegal drug use or as calling for the legalization of drug use. Bowman,
supra note 3, at 216 n.136. This makes it unclear how one can square the majority opinion's rule
that schools may proscribe speech that can reasonably be interpreted as promoting illegal drug use
with Justice Alito's insistence that the opinion not be read to allow restriction of speech that "can
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue." Morse, 127 S. Ct. at
2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
29 John E. Taylor, Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination (Nov. 5, 2007) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW).
30 In Harper v. Poway Unified School District., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484
(2007), the Ninth Circuit upheld a school's authority under Tinker to restrict a T-shirt condemning
homosexuality by relying on the idea that the shirt interfered with the rights of gay and lesbian
students. As Professor Bowman's discussion indicates, Harper gives far more bite to the "rights
of others" prong of Tinker than it is usually taken to have. Bowman, supra note 3, at 205-07.
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rights of others. The degree of the protection here depends on how much evi-
dence of disruption courts require and on whether courts give independent sig-
nificance to the "rights of others" prong. Courts take different stances on both
these matters, but often the protection afforded by the conventional reading of
Tinker is substantial. 31 I believe that Tinker also can and should be read to pro-
hibit purposeful viewpoint discrimination, and this reading provides some addi-
tional protection for controversial religious (as well as non-religious) speech.
Even speech that is substantially disruptive or interferes with the rights of others
should still be protected if there is evidence of differential enforcement that
suggests purposeful viewpoint discrimination by school officials.
32
These protections are significant, but I suspect they fall well short of
what is desired by those who wish to maximize protection for controversial reli-
gious speech in the public schools. On the most protective view, showing that a
school has restricted a controversial religious point of view without muzzling
that view's competitors would-without more---establish unconstitutional view-
point discrimination.33 In other words, this reading of Tinker would require
schools to ensure that restrictions on student speech have no significant view-
point-differential effects. In practice, this would mean that a school worried
about the disruptive effects of student speech condemning, e.g., homosexuality
would face a choice between leaving that speech unrestricted and broadening its
restriction to include the entire subject-matter at issue. Even if we can coher-
ently decide how broad the restriction would have to be to count as the regula-
34tion of subject matter rather than (religious) viewpoint, requiing either very
Although the Supreme Court's disposition of Harper means the case is no longer binding law in
the Ninth Circuit, its aggressive use of the "rights of others" prong might still prove influential.
31 For decisions protecting provocative speech under Tinker, see, e.g., Chandler v. McMinn-
ville School District, 978 F.2d 524, 526, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1992) (protecting students' buttons with
the word "scab" referring to replacement teachers during a strike), and Barber v. Dearborn Public
Schools, 286 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849, 860 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (protecting T-shirt with picture of
President George W. Bush and a caption reading "International Terrorist").
32 In the reported cases applying Tinker, this possibility is raised most directly by the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Castorina v Madison City School Board, 246 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2001).
There, the school had suspended students for wearing T-shirts that included images of the Con-
federate flag (among others) but had allegedly allowed students to wear shirts bearing an "X" (for
Malcolm X). The court remanded for further fact finding on how the school had dealt with the
"X"-shirts and on the degree of disruption (if any) caused by both the Confederate flag shirts and
the "X" shirts. Id. at 544. In my view, findings on remand that both shirts had been disruptive but
that only the Confederate flag shins were restricted would raise a strong inference of purposeful
viewpoint discrimination and would render the school's restriction of only the Confederate flag
shirts unconstitutional even if the wearing of those shirts had led to substantial disruption.
33 The "more" that I would require is evidence that the school has restricted only one side of a
controversy not because of judgments about differences in the harms associated with the speech,
but because of sympathy or disagreement with the ideas expressed. Because evidence of differen-
tial effects can be evidence of improper intent, disentangling one from the other is a significant
hurdle. I discuss this and other problems in Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination, supra note 29.
34 This is no easy task. Perhaps a school that restricts T-shirts proclaiming that homosexuality
is shameful must also restrict shirts saying "Gay? Fine by Me" to achieve viewpoint neutrality.
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broad speech restrictions or none at all would put schools to a Hobson's choice
and might make them significantly less likely to restrict student religious
speech. Reading this kind of a viewpoint-neutrality requirement into Tinker
would significantly increase protection for controversial religious speech, but
would do so at great potential cost to school authority over the educational envi-
ronment. I argue in my companion piece that the existing case law does not and
should not read Tinker to require that student speech regulations have view-
point-neutral effects.
C. Student Speech and Public Forum Doctrine
Professor Bowman briefly makes a fourth point in observing that the
categories of public forum doctrine are unhelpful in analyzing student speech
that occurs during the school day while school is in session. I agree. Though I
do not have the space here for a full discussion, I want to sketch three reasons
why I believe there is usually no need to use public forum doctrine when stu-
dents speak in the context of normal school operations. 35 In such contexts, pub-
lic forum doctrine tends to be either superfluous or pernicious.
My first point is that the applicable Supreme Court precedents do not
require running every student speech case through the mill of public forum doc-
trine. Of the Court's cases governing student speech during the school day, only
Hazelwood uses forum analysis, and on my reading, it does so only to rebut the
argument that the school had relinquished its rights to editorial control over the
Must it also restrict a shirt that says "Tolerance," or does that address a different subject matter?
Must a school that restricts Confederate flag shirts also restrict shirts with an image of black and
white hands clasped in harmony? Cf. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749,
750 (5th Cir. 1966) (describing "freedom buttons" worn by African-American students which
depicted "a black and white hand joined together with 'SNCC' inscribed in the margin"). On the
difficulty of drawing the subject matter/viewpoint distinction, see Wojciech Sadurski, Does the
Subject Matter? Viewpoint Neutrality and Freedom of Speech, 15 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J.
315, 354 (1997) ("One way of viewing the difficulties in characterizing a regulation as content-
neutral, content-based, or viewpoint-based is that it largely depends on the level of generality of
the question asked.").
35 It is important to be explicit about the limits of my point. I do not deny that forum doctrine
retains whatever usefulness it generally has in cases involving after-hours access to school prop-
erty for community and student groups. Forum doctrine also seems appropriate where non-
student groups seek to distribute literature by coming onto school property or using school distri-
bution channels. See, e.g., Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Township Sch.
Dist., 386 F.3d 514 (3d Cir. 2004) (using forum doctrine to evaluate exclusion of religious group
from school's channels for distribution of community materials to students). Situations where
students distribute literature are more complex, and courts have differed over whether forum
analysis is appropriate in these kinds of cases. Compare Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98
F.3d 1530, 1539-40 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying forum doctrine to analyze a student's distribution of
invitations to a religious meeting at his church) with Rivera v. East Otero Sch. Dist. R-1, 721 F.
Supp. 1189, 1192-93 (D. Colo. 1989) (applying Tinker and explicitly refusing to use forum doc-




Taylor: Why Student Religious Speech is Speech
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2007
WEST VIRGINIA L4W REVIEW
student newspaper by creating a limited public forum for wide open expression
by student journalists. 36 It seems clear that a school could choose to do this, and
that if the school did so it would be required to honor the terms of the forum it
created.37 In Hazelwood, this would have meant that any content-based regula-
tion of speech falling within the defined boundaries of the forum would have
been subjected to strict scrutiny and the students would presumably have won
their case. The Court simply rejected the argument that the school had taken the
actions necessary to create this kind of forum. It did not go on to say-let alone
hold-that public schools must always be treated as some kind of forum when
students challenge restrictions of their speech during school hours.
Hazelwood, then, teaches that forum doctrine can be relevant when
there is evidence that a school has voluntarily renounced some of its usual au-
thority over student speech in particular contexts. My second point is that in the
absence of such evidence, the general concerns of forum doctrine do not mesh
well with questions about a school's regulatory authority over the speech of its
students during school hours. This may be one of the reasons the Court says
relatively little about it in Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse.38 Public fo-
rum doctrine, as Douglas Laycock has pointed out, generally comes into play
when speakers seek rights of speech and access to government property.39 But
during regular school hours there is no question of access rights for students-
their presence is the whole point of having a school. Thus it makes little sense
36 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267-70 (1988). This is Part II-A of the
Court's opinion, which culminates in the assertion that "[s]chool officials did not evince ... any
intent to open the pages of Spectrum to 'indiscriminate use' by its student reporters and editors, or
by the student body generally." Id. at 270. Having rejected the claim that a public forum was
created, the Court then goes on to discuss the category of school-sponsored speech without any
further mention of forum doctrine. See Waldman, supra note 16, at 10. The chief obstacle to my
reading is that at the end of Part Il-A, the Court cites a public forum case in announcing that the
school could regulate the student newspaper "in any reasonable manner." Id. (citing Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)). This reference is some evidence
that the Court thought of the Hazelwood case as an application of the general standards governing
nonpublic fora, but in my view the absence of any further reference to forum doctrine (or, more
specifically, to Perry's prohibition on viewpoint discrimination even in nonpublic fora) in the
opinion outweighs this evidence and I therefore regard the reference to Perry as a throw-away.
37 Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (stating that
"[o]nce it has opened a limited forum, ... the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has
itself set."); Jay Alan Sekulow, James Henderson & John Tuskey, Proposed Guidelines for Stu-
dent Religious Speech and Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REv. 1017, 1030 (1995).
38 My claim may be somewhat overstated with respect to Tinker, for it has been argued that
"public forum doctrine" as we know it today did not exist until 1972, three years after Tinker was
decided. See Post, supra note 16, at 1714.
39 Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious
Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 48 (1986); cf. Post, supra note 16, at 1781
(highlighting similarities between public forum cases and decisions concerning the internal man-
agement of speech by government employees and suggesting that public forum cases deal with
situations where the government's authority to manage speech internal to government institutions
is called into question by a member of the general public rather than a member of the institution).
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to ask questions about whether a school has "intentionally opened up" its class-
rooms and hallways for speech by students during the school day as opposed to
retaining control over these areas of the school as a nonpublic forum.4n
Third, public forum doctrine is beset with so many intellectual difficul-
ties in its home context that it seems positively perverse to import it into student
speech cases unless the law demands it. (And, as my first point indicates, it
does not.) Few doctrines have been so heavily and uniformly criticized,41 and
much of that criticism is dominated by a common theme: forum doctrine's ex-
cessive focus on "the character of the government property at issue" and its use
of a small number of categories produce a set of legal rules that is formalistic in
the extreme, showing little connection to the sorts of policies at issue when citi-
42zens seek to exercise their speech rights on government property. If public
forum doctrine in its home context has been widely derided for its excessive
formalism, what are we to say of the following line of argument? "Schools are
public property so they must be some kind of forum, and even in a nonpublic
forum viewpoint restrictions are extremely difficult to justify, so schools must
not be allowed to engage in viewpoint discrimination even with respect to
speech that is part of the school curriculum. 4 3 This might or might not be the
correct answer, but I would characterize this mode of argument as formalism
that is not merely excessive but positively mindless. Completely absent is any
consideration of what I think is the right question: do schools need the ability to
engage in viewpoint discrimination to carry out their educational missions?44 In
40 The senselessness of such questions is illustrated by the analysis in Slotterback v. Interboro
School District, 766 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Pa. 1991). There, the court observed that it is "intrinsic to
the dedication of a school" that an open forum for student speech is created. Id. at 293. Function-
ally, of course, this serves as a way of minimizing the importance of forum doctrine on student
speech cases and therefore shows good instincts on the part of the court. But the whole point of
forum doctrine (outside the context of the traditional public forum, which all agree is not the rele-
vant category for public schools) is that the government can choose whether and to what extent to
open up its property as a forum for expression. To speak of "intrinsic dedications" to communica-
tive purposes is a tacit admission that the language of public forum doctrine has been carried too
far from the contexts where it might prove useful.
41 Post, supra note 16, at 1716 n.7 (collecting critical articles).
42 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 93 (1987)
(stating the questions posed by public forum doctrine are "the wrong questions" and that First
Amendment rights on public property "should turn not on the common law property rights of the
government ... but on a reasonable accommodation of the competing speech and governmental
interests").
43 Cf. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 626-27 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that
the school was a nonpublic forum because it had taken no affirmative steps to open itself up for
public use); id. at 633 (ruling that Hazelwood prohibits viewpoint discrimination because it cited
public forum cases that prohibited viewpoint discrimination even in nonpublic fora).
44 The formulation of the question here is indebted to Post, supra note 16, who suggests that
public forum cases, public employee speech cases, and student speech cases share common
ground in that all concern the government's "managerial" authority over speech within govern-
ment institutions. Id. at 1767-83. In all these cases, the fundamental question is "whether the
2007]
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the main run of student speech cases, courts would do better to focus on this
type of question and forget about the categories of public forum doctrine.
Ill. FREE SPEECH AS THE WORKHORSE IN PROTECTING STUDENT RELIGIOUS
EXPRESSION
I now turn to my principal topic and Professor Bowman's first point:
that it is the Free Speech Clause and not the Free Exercise Clause that is the true
workhorse in the protection of student religious expression in the public schools.
I believe this claim is true, and that its truth is overdetermined in ways that I will
explain more fully in a moment. I will suggest, however, that there is at least a
bit of a puzzle about why it should be true in the public school context. Solving
that puzzle can show us something important about the relationships between
the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
A. Speech or Religious Exercise: A Choice of Characterization
It seems clear that a great deal of religious activity can be classified as
both the exercise of religion and as speech. Lots of the things religious people
do--preaching, proselytizing, praying, offering witness-are conventionally
expressive activity, and have long been recognized as speech by the Supreme
Court.45 Further, a good deal of religiously motivated conduct that is not con-
ventionally expressive arguably qualifies as symbolic speech under Spence v.
Washington.46 It has been suggested that even core religious rituals like Chris-
tian communion may be seen as intended (and understood) communications and
thus as symbolic speech.47 It also seems clear that categorizing an instance of
religious activity as speech or as religious exercise can have significant doctrinal
authority to regulate speech is necessary for the achievement of legitimate institutional objec-
tives." Id. at 1771.
45 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981) (characterizing "religious worship
and discussion" as "forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment"); Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943) (protecting religious solicitation by Jehovah's
Witnesses on both free speech and free exercise grounds); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
307 (1940) (same).
46 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (stating that conduct qualifies as speech if intended to "convey
a particularized message ... [and] ... in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it").
47 Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 71, 75 (2001)
("The act of communion is intended as a communication by the congregants to each other and,
more importantly, to their God, and non-congregants in our society generally understand the act of
communion as a communication of some sort."). At the same time, Tushnet notes that portraying
a ritual like communion simply as speech is an unsatisfyingly thin description. Id. at 75 n.21; cf
Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and
Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 185 (2002) ("Treating religion as speech simply leaves too
many other aspects of religion out of the picture on the constitutional cutting room floor.")
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consequences. 48  Specifically, the Free Exercise Clause (at least in circum-
stances where it retains significant force) is usually read to privilege religiously
motivated conduct over analogous secular conduct, 49 while the Free Speech
Clause is generally understood to require that religious speech be treated neither
better nor worse than analogous secular speech.a We know, then, that some
48 Brownstein, supra note 47, describes various ways in which the possibility of characterizing
religious activity both as speech and as religion can lead to doctrinal conflicts:
Religious speakers might demand special free exercise protection against con-
tent-neutral laws restricting speech that secular speakers must obey. Statutory
exemptions from content-neutral regulations for religious speakers might be
challenged on Speech Clause or Establishment Clause grounds and defended
on free exercise grounds. Restrictions on religious expression might be both
challenged on free exercise or free speech grounds, and defended, if the
speech received government support or communicated a message of govern-
ment endorsement, on Establishment Clause grounds.
Id. at 130. Brownstein explains that during the 1980's, the Supreme Court began to confront
cases in which these conflicts were impossible to ignore. Id.
49 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (stating that the Amish's relig-
iously-rooted desire to separate themselves from contemporary society was entitled to First
Amendment protection whereas a philosophical choice of separation in the manner of Thoreau
would not be). The extent of this privileging will of course depend on how strong free exercise
protection is understood to be, and after Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), it
could be said that in most cases the Free Exercise Clause no longer privileges religious exercise
because it does not protect religious exercise at all. But cf. note 67 infra (discussing the scholarly
debate about the degree to which post-Smith free exercise law still provides meaningful protec-
tion). Still, it remains the case that wherever the Free Exercise Clause does have significant force,
it will sometimes provide more protection for religiously motivated conduct than for analogous
secular conduct. For example, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), survives Smith on the
ground that it involved a system of individualized exemptions. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. This
means that even after Smith, a person denied unemployment compensation because she refused to
take a job that would have required her to work on her Sabbath would have a greater chance of
obtaining judicial relief than a person who refused the same job because of her inability to find
adequate weekend child care. The argument that free exercise law should not generally be under-
stood to privilege religiously motivated conduct over secular claims of conscience is pressed most
vigorously by Provost Christopher L. Eisgruber and Dean Lawrence G. Sager in RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 112-18 (2007) [hereinafter EISGRUBER & SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM] and in earlier articles including The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional
Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245, 1291-97 (1994).
50 In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981),
the Court stated:
None of our cases suggest that the inclusion of peripatetic solicitation as part
of a church ritual entitles church members to solicitation rights in a public fo-
rum superior to those of members of other religious groups that raise money
but do not purport to ritualize the process. Nor for present purposes do reli-
gious organizations enjoy rights to communicate, distribute, and solicit on the
fairgrounds superior to those of other organizations having social, political, or
other ideological messages to proselytize. These nonreligious organizations
seeking support for their activities are entitled to rights equal to those of reli-
gious groups to enter a public forum and spread their views, whether by solic-
iting funds or by distributing literature.
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religious activity can be treated either as religion or speech and that the choice
matters.5 Yet the questions of whether and when to treat religious activity as
speech remain remarkably undertheorized in the case law and even (though to a
lesser extent) in the commentary.52
There are, of course, many possible positions here. To name just a few,
one could treat as speech all religiously motivated activity that can be treated as
speech while regarding the Free Exercise Clause as largely superfluous. 53 One
could say that even the most conventionally speech-like religious activity should
be protected by the Free Exercise Clause but not by the Speech Clause-the
position advocated by Justice White in his Widmar v. Vincent dissent but em-
phatically rejected by the Court.54 One could try to identify some sorts of reli-
gious activity that should be treated only as speech,55 while treating other reli-
gious activity as protected only by the Free Exercise Clause or as doubly pro-
Id. at 652-53; see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 766
(1995) (plurality opinion) ("Of course, giving sectarian religious speech preferential access to a
forum close to the seat of government (or anywhere else for that matter) would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause (as well as the Free Speech Clause, since it would involve content discrimina-
tion)"); Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 790 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., concurring)
("Religious speech is speech, entitled to exactly the same protection from government restriction
as any other kind of speech-no more and no less"); Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and
Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 612-25 (1999) (arguing persuasively and at
length for the proposition that the Supreme Court case law is best read to say that religious speech
gets neither more nor less protection than analogous secular speech).
51 Treating religious speech as the exercise of religion also brings Establishment Clause values
more directly into play. The question of whether student speech that would be protected by the
Free Speech Clause can nonetheless by restricted because of the Establishment Clause is obvi-
ously important, but it is beyond the scope of my concerns here. For detailed argument that the
Establishment Clause sometimes reduces speech protections for religious student speech in the
public schools, see generally Steven G. Gey, When is Religious Speech Not "Free Speech"?, 2000
U. ILu. L. REv. 379. My concern here is with the question of whether treating student religious
speech as the exercise of religion could ever provide more protection than the Free Speech Clause
would provide.
52 Brownstein, supra note 47, is the most helpful discussion I have encountered.
53 This is roughly the approach advocated by William P. Marshall in Solving the Free Exercise
Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REv. 545 (1983). Tushnet, supra note 47,
suggests that under the Supreme Court's current precedents the freedoms of speech and associa-
tion provide essentially all the protection religious activity enjoys and that the Free Exercise
Clause has thus been rendered "redundant."
54 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 283 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); see also Brownstein,
supra note 47, at 182 (suggesting that the costs of treating religious activity as speech rather than
as religion generally outweigh the benefits and that religious activity should be treated as speech
only "sometimes" and "with caution"). But see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270 n.6 (rejecting Justice
White's arguments).
55 See Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions - A Research Agenda
With Test Suites, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 595, 613-16 (1999) (discussing three possible approaches
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tected by both Clauses. 6 One could treat all religious behavior that can count as
speech as doubly protected by both the Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, with
the explicit proviso that religiously motivated speech should be treated as
speech or as religion depending on which approach would offer the greatest
protection.57 Choices among these positions have significant consequences and,
as Professor Brownstein points out, they should be made self-consciously with
careful attention to the costs and benefits of each option. 58
The Supreme Court has not been especially self-conscious in its few
pronouncements on the speech versus religion issue, often ignoring obvious
questions or making significant choices without argument or explanation. 59 Yet
we know at least that the Supreme Court in Widmar squarely rejected the idea
that expressive religious activity should be protected only by the Free Exercise
Clause. Instead, the Court took and continues to take the position that conven-
tionally expressive religious activities, even activities like worship and prayer
that have no obvious secular analogues, are fully protectable as speech: "private
religious speech... is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secu-
lar private expression. ' 6°
56 The problem with the "double protection" idea, however, is that (as I have already sug-
gested) sometimes the implications of the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses point in differ-
ent directions. Where this is so, the double protection strategy requires some decision rule indi-
cating which principle trumps in situations of conflict.
57 Perhaps this last position can be defended if one takes the idea of religion as a "preferred
freedom" very seriously, but one could reasonably suspect that this approach is akin to having
one's cake and eating it too. During the period when the Court discussed the freedoms of speech,
press, and religion as "preferred freedoms," Justice Murphy's dissent in Jones v. City of Opelika,
316 U.S. 584 (1942), suggested that religious freedom was even more preferred than the freedoms
of speech and press. Id. at 621 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("Important as free speech and a free
press are to a free government and a free citizenry, there is a right even more dear to many indi-
viduals - the right to worship their Maker according to their needs and the dictates of their souls
and to carry their message or their gospel to every living creature."). But the Court seemed to
repudiate this idea two years later. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944) (sug-
gesting that "it may be doubted that any of the [First Amendment's] great liberties.., can be
given higher place than the others"). For a good general discussion of the "preferred freedoms"
approach to incorporation, see Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original
Meaning of the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 459, 502-12 (2001).
58 Brownstein, supra note 47, at 122-23.
59 See id. at 131 (stating that the Court in Heffron "simply ignored two obvious questions,"
including the question of whether the Krishnas' solicitation should be understood as religion or
speech); id. at 135-39 (commenting on the oddity of the Court's primarily treating Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), as an Establishment Clause case rather than a speech case).
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B. Convergence on Speech as the Preferred Strategy for Protecting Reli-
gious Expression
It is one thing to say that the Supreme Court has long been willing to
treat much religious activity as speech and to protect it on that basis. It is an-
other to explain how people with very different views have converged on the
Free Speech Clause as the preferred vehicle for protecting religious expression
both inside the schools and elsewhere.6' Painting with a very broad brush, I
would tell the story of this development in the following way.
On one side, we have people we can call "religionists. ' '62 They want to
maximize the space for private religious expression in the public schools and in
the public square, and wish religious practices to be as free from the burdens of
government regulation as possible. For such people, a focus on Free Speech
protection for speech-like religious activity is appealing because historically the
Free Exercise Clause has always been weaker than the Free Speech Clause. In
the Court's early cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses in the 1930's and 1940's,
the Court often linked the Witnesses' free speech and free exercise interests, but
stand-alone free exercise claims failed and the Speech Clause appeared to do the
real work in cases where the Witnesses prevailed.63 The Free Exercise Clause
61 Cf. Brownstein, supra note 47, at 184 (bemoaning the "uncritical acceptance" of the idea
that religion should be conceptualized as speech to the greatest possible extent).
62 It is hard to find relatively neutral terminology to label groups of people who may differ
among themselves considerably. I have drawn this terminology from the helpful analysis in Ira C.
Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47
VILL. L. REv. 37 (2002), partly on the theory that "religionists" is a less loaded and perhaps more
accurate label than "religious conservatives." All the usual caveats about labels and typologies
apply, though the use of these kinds of ideal types has become commonplace in the Religion
Clauses literature. See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE
PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 7-8 (2005) (organizing discussion around divi-
sion between "legal secularists" and "values evangelicals"). I should note that I am losing some of
the flavor of Lupu's and Tuttle's label in borrowing it, for they construct a four-part typology that
captures general attitudes on both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause issues. To give a very
crude summary, they portray religionists as desiring a strong Free Exercise Clause and a weak
Establishment Clause, separationists as desiring a strong Free Exercise Clause and a strong Estab-
lishment Clause, secularists as desiring a weak Free Exercise Clause and a strong Establishment
Clause, and neutralists as desiring weak versions of both Clauses so as to maximize space for
legislative discretion. Here, I am using "religionists" as a label that is broad enough to encompass
anyone who wants aggressive protection of free exercise interests in the public schools, whether it
is Douglas Laycock or the lawyers from the American Center for Law & Justice. In practice,
though, the label is fairly apt here even if read more narrowly because the most aggressive cham-
pions of religious expression in the public schools are religionists in Lupu's and Tuttle's more
precise sense. They wish to maximize the space for religious expression in the schools even at a
cost to what others might see as Establishment Clause values. Separationists perform a more
complex balancing act in seeing strong versions of both Clauses as necessary to a proper concep-
tion of religious liberty in the schools.
63 Stephan M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First Amendment Protections: Why Does
the Supreme Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431,
447-48 (2006). Feldman draws upon the theory of ingroup-outgroup differentiation to make the
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remained weaker than the Speech Clause during the Sherbert-Yoder era,64 when
substantial burdens on the free exercise of religion were subjected to a form of
strict scrutiny that turned out to be "strict in theory, but ever so gentle in fact." 65
The relative weakness of the Free Exercise Clause is all the more obvious after
Employment Division v. Smith, where the Court declared that neutral and gener-
ally applicable laws that burden religious exercise do not violate the Free Exer-
66cise Clause. Those who believe that Smith robbed the Free Exercise Clause of
interesting if unflattering suggestion that speech claims were more successful than free exercise
claims in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases because the latter more starkly emphasized claimants'
differences from the mainstream and therefore were more likely to trigger the ingroup prejudices
of Justices against outgroup claimants. Id. at 468-74.
64 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). This
era ran roughly from 1963 (the year of the Sherbert decision) to 1990 (the year of the Supreme
Court's decision in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)). Depending on one's point of view, this period was either a brief window of light during
which the Court showed at least a glimmer of appreciation for the importance of religious liberty,
see, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 5-12 (1994) (outlining the narrative of free exercise
law with the Sherbert-Yoder-RFRA approach as the hero and Smith as the villain), or an anoma-
lous departure from an otherwise consistent adherence to the approach adopted in Smith, see, e.g.,
MARcI HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 203-227 (2005) (sketch-
ing the counter-narrative with Smith and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), as pro-
tagonists).
65 Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 756 (1992).
66 Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. Student speech restrictions on, e.g., speech denigrating other stu-
dents on the basis of their sexual orientation would presumably count as neutral and generally
applicable laws under Smith and thus would present no opportunity for a meaningful free exercise
challenge. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1187 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating
that the plaintiff's free exercise argument against the school's restriction of his anti-gay T-shirt
would "surely fail" under Smith because there was no evidence that the school's prohibition "was
applied to him because of his religious views"), cert. granted, judgment vacated, case remanded
with instructions to dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). One can imagine counter-arguments
on this point, however. It could be asserted that such rules may be tainted by anti-religious ani-
mus, though this would be difficult to prove in the face of a school's argument that the point of
such a rule is to create and sustain a good learning environment for gay and lesbian students, not
to suppress religious speech. It could also be argued that school officials' judgments under
Tinker's substantial disruption standard allow so much potential for discretion and hence for
veiled discrimination that they ought to be treated as falling within the "system of individualized
exemptions" exception to Smith. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-84 (explaining that Sherbert v. Verner
and its progeny survive Smith because the "good cause" standard in unemployment compensation
schemes involved "individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant con-
duct"); cf. Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise and Individualized Exemptions: Herein of Smith,
Sherbert, Hogwarts, and Religious Liberty, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1178, 1188 (2005) (arguing for an
expansive construction of this exception to reach nearly any instance in which officials exercise
discretionary authority). As to the latter argument, I share Professor Tushnet's sense that the
"individualized exemptions" exception to Smith is difficult to square with Smith in any event and
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nearly all its force67 would naturally have strategic reasons for focusing on the
Free Speech Clause as the only game in town for protecting religious liberty
under the Federal Constitution.68 In addition, religionists seeking to widen the
space for religious expression in the public square have embraced the strategy of
characterizing religious activity as speech as a way of defusing Establishment
Clause concerns.69 This strategy bore fruit in Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visi-
tors of University of Virginia70 and in the equal access decisions discussed by
Professor Bowman.71 The focus on speech made it possible to consider access
to government property as a matter of equal treatment rather than as the illicit
advancing of religion.72 In light of these points, it is no surprise that religiously
67 There is an ongoing debate about whether the various exceptions recognized in Smith (par-
ticularly the idea that laws failing to be "neutral and generally applicable" should receive strict
scrutiny) continue to provide nontrivial free exercise protections even in Smith's wake. Compare,
e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi, and the
General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850 (2001) (arguing that many laws fail
to be neutral and generally applicable because exemptions for various secular interests render the
laws underinclusive with respect to their stated purposes), and Douglas Laycock, The Supreme
Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH. LAW. 25 (2000) (same), with Daniel 0. Conkle, The Free
Exercise Clause: How Redundant, and Why?, 33 Loy. U. CHm. L.J. 95, 109 (2001) (expressing
doubt that free exercise protection after Smith extends much beyond laws that target religion), and
Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 IND.
L.J. 77, 114 (2000) (stating that a law only fails to be neutral and generally applicable under Smith
and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), if the law is "so dramati-
cally underinclusive that religious conduct is virtually the only conduct to which the law applies").
I need not enter that debate here; for present purposes, it is enough to point out that many people
believe Smith provides precious little religious liberty protection and that this belief helps to moti-
vate a focus on the Free Speech Clause.
68 See, e.g., Sekulow et al., supra note 37, at 1018 (identifying the idea that religious speech is
fully protected by the Free Speech Clause as the "first principle" necessary to establish adequate
protection for religious expression in the public schools); cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a
Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 925, 926, 931-32 (observing that
religious exemptions are no longer justifiable in our current cultural environment and that those
who seek meaningful protection for religious liberty ought to set about developing doctrinal ap-
proaches that would protect religious exercise not "as speech, but rather like speech"). Professor
Gedicks also suggests that proper application of the fundamental rights strand of Equal Protection
doctrine may provide significant protection for religious liberty and could serve as an alternative
justification for the claims made by Duncan and Laycock, supra note 67, that underinclusive laws
are presumptively unconstitutional because they fail to be neutral and generally applicable under
Smith. Gedicks, supra note 67, at 117-19.
69 Brownstein, supra note 47, at 144 (suggesting that the "preference for a free speech model"
in cases like Rosenberger is probably best explained "by the utility of this approach for undermin-
ing Establishment Clause constraints on state promotion and support for religion").
70 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
71 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Bowman, supra note 3, at 211-14 (discuss-
ing these cases).
72 See Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J.
43, 53-67 (1997) (narrating the history of Establishment Clause doctrine as one of tension be-
tween the principles of "no aid" to religion and nondiscrimination regarding religion and explain-
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conservative advocacy organizations like the American Center for Law & Jus-
tice have explicitly staked their efforts to protect student religious expression on
the Free Speech Clause.73
From the other side, secularists74 have long focused on speech as the
preferred vehicle for protecting religious liberty because of doubts about the
wisdom of constitutionally compelled religious exemptions from general laws
under the Free Exercise Clause. From this perspective, free speech doctrine
provides all the protection religious activity needs and all that it should get.
We have, then, a kind of overlapping consensus in which people with
very different points of view agree that the Free Speech Clause ought to be the
focus in religious liberty litigation both in the schools and elsewhere. This con-
sensus, however, masks underlying disagreements. Unlike secularists who are
skeptical of constitutional free exercise exemptions, religionists have embraced
free speech protection for tactical reasons. They would emphasize that religious
expression gets at least as much protection as the Free Speech Clause provides,
but some would add that where the Free Exercise Clause can provide more pro-
tection it should be allowed to do SO. 76 Exemptions skeptics, on the other hand,
ing that Rosenberger forced the Court to confront this tension and to resolve it in favor of the no-
aid principle.).
73 Sekulow et al., supra note 37, at 1018-19. The ACLJ guidelines summarize the organiza-
tion's position by stating that the proper resolution of questions about student religious expression
in the public schools depends on three principles: (1) the Free Speech Clause protects religious
speech (including worship), (2) the Free Speech Clause categorically forbids viewpoint-based
restrictions of speech and usually requires a compelling interest to restrict speech on the basis of
its content (i.e. subject matter), and (3) the First Amendment (specifically, the Establishment
Clause) applies only to state and not private action. The authors add that government "must treat
religious speech just as it treats any other type of speech," id. at 1018, but in the context the point
is clearly that the Establishment Clause provides no reason for treating religious speech worse
than secular speech. There is no statement that religious speech may not be treated more favora-
bly than secular speech, and in one sense the complex of positions endorsed by the ACLJ here
requires that kind of treatment. Viewpoint discrimination is categorically forbidden in their view,
and religious speech always counts as the expression of a viewpoint. See Conkle, supra note 67,
at 113-14 (explaining that in a limited sense religious speech occupies a preferred status under
cases like Rosenberger, Lamb's Chapel, and Good News Club because religion is apparently
always to be treated as a viewpoint rather than as a subject matter). For criticisms of the Court's
tendency to always treat religion as a viewpoint, see Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints from Olympus,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 697 (1996).
74 The label is from Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 62. I discuss my reasons for using their labels
in note 62 as well.
75 See Marshall, supra note 53, at 593 ("Any judicially created exemption granted to those
expressing a religious interest may be constitutionally required only when such an exemption
would be similarly required for those expressing parallel free speech claims."); Steven G. Gey,
Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 75, 181 (1990) (stating that the
"[g]ovemment has no free exercise obligation beyond protecting religious belief, and the verbal or
symbolic expression of religious belief").
76 Cf. Brownstein, supra note 47, at 137 (characterizing Justice Scalia's position in Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), as treating the Free Speech Clause as a "one-way
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would point out that this result is highly problematic from the standpoint of free
speech doctrine because treating religious speech better than analogous secular
speech looks like content discrimination and perhaps even viewpoint discrimi-
nation.
These differences of opinion are real and important, but given the cur-
rent anemic state of free exercise law they are masked in most situations.
Where religious activity can be treated as speech, the Free Speech Clause will
usually provide stronger protection than the Free Exercise Clause; and where
speech doctrine fails to protect, free exercise doctrine will not be much help
either. Accordingly, the question of whether religious speech should ever get
more protection than analogous secular speech is usually moot. In the public
school setting, however, things look different for two reasons.
C. Student Speech Law and Hybrid Rights
First, free speech protections are a good bit weaker inside the public
schools than outside them. Tinker, the most protective student speech standard,
allows schools to restrict student speech that merely "happens to occur on the
school premises" 77 if the school can prove that the speech has been or is rea-
sonably anticipated to be materially and substantially disruptive to the school
environment or that the speech interferes with the rights of others "to be secure
and to be let alone., 78 Because schools that restrict speech under the authority
of Tinker are acting on the basis of the communicative impact of the speech
ratchet when religious expression is at issue" because "[d]iscrimination against religious speech is
prohibited, but discrimination in favor of religious speech is permissible"); Holly Coates Keehn,
Terroristic Religious Speech: Giving the Devil the Benefit of the First Amendment Free Exercise
and Free Speech Clauses, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1230, 1260 (1998) (stating that religious
speech should receive greater protection than secular speech because secular speech is "protected
by only one clause of the First Amendment" whereas "[rieligious speech is doubly protected and
as such deserves a higher level of judicial deference"). I should acknowledge, however, that my
characterization of some religionists as embracing the one-way ratchet theory is open to dispute,
as it is relatively uncommon to find explicit avowals - let alone defenses - of the theory. Even
staunch advocates of preferential treatment for religious conduct may disavow any implication
that religious speech gets special treatment. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of
Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 6-9, 40 (2000) (stating that equal treatment is the
governing principle "when a conflict centers on the right of free speech" and that "[flavoring
religious speakers over similarly situated nonreligious speakers would violate the viewpoint-
neutrality requirement of the Free Speech Clause"). I would suggest, however, that many relig-
ionists are probably sympathetic to the ratchet theory at some level in that they embrace both the
view that religious activity should be protected as speech and the view that discretionary religion-
specific accommodations should be treated favorably. As I explain below, these positions are in
considerable tension with one another and the failure to notice this tension may suggest an im-
plicit assumption that the characterization of religious activity as speech or conduct depends on
which approach would most benefit religious claimants. See infra notes 161-166, 189-194 and
accompanying text.
77 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
78 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969).
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(i.e., how others will react to the speaker's message), these speech restrictions
should be understood as content-based. 79  And while the Tinker standard (at
least as applied by some courts) has considerable bite,80 it still falls well short of
the genuinely strict scrutiny applied to content-based regulations of speech in
most contexts. 81 Fraser, which governs "lewd," "vulgar," or "offensive"
speech, also is less protective than the standards applied to analogous speech
outside the schools. 82  Hazelwood's principle that restrictions of school-
sponsored speech must be "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns" is not a demanding one, and Hazelwood may be read to allow viewpoint
discrimination even though this is almost categorically prohibited in general free
speech law.83 Finally, the Court's new decision in Morse accords no protection
at all to speech that advocates illegal drug use, and does so without any of the
limitations that normally apply to government restrictions of speech inciting
illegal conduct. 84  Across the board, then, speech protection in the public
schools is weaker than in most other contexts. If one reads Smith to have writ-
ten the Free Exercise Clause out of the Constitution, however, it would still
seem that something is better than nothing, and the question of whether the Free
Exercise Clause can be read to privilege religious over secular speech would
still be moot.
Here, however, the so-called "hybrid rights" exception to Smith comes
into play.85 As Professor Bowman notes, every First Amendment challenge to
79 Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of
Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81, 81-82 n.3 (1978) (citing the armband prohibi-
tion in Tinker as an example of a government restriction that is content-neutral on its face "but
that is directed at a harm caused by the content of the speech"); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Con-
duct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances,"
and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1286-87 (arguing that laws are "content-
based as applied" when the law's application is triggered by the content of the speech and that
such laws "should be presumptively unconstitutional, just as facially content-based laws are pre-
sumptively unconstitutional").
80 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
81 Stone, supra note 27, at 196 (noting that "in assessing the constitutionality of content-based
restrictions on high value expression, the Court employs a standard that approaches absolute pro-
tection").
82 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). On the contrast between the
treatment of vulgar, lewd, or offensive speech inside and outside the public schools, see supra
note 18.
83 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). On the question of whether
Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination, see generally Waldman, supra note 16; R. George
Wright, School-Sponsored Speech and the Surprising Case for Viewpoint-Based Regulations, 31
S. ILL. U. L.J. 175 (2007).
84 See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
85 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (state RFRAs) modeled after the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (2000), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), are another
possible source of free exercise protections that might theoretically lead to better treatment for
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the restriction of student religious speech carries the theoretical possibility of
becoming a hybrid of free speech and free exercise rights.86 Some of these chal-
lenges may also implicate the substantive due process right of parents to direct
the upbringing of their children that is usually traced to Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters. 87 In either case, the hybrid claims might warrant strict scrutiny-at least
the old, relatively gentle Sherbert-Yoder strict scrutiny if not the strict scrutiny
,,88that "really means what it says. Still, even this more modest form of strict
scrutiny will sometimes provide a more rigorous standard of review than the
Supreme Court's student speech cases would provide on their own.89 This raises
student religious speech than analogous nonreligious speech. See generally Thomas C. Berg,
State Religious Freedom Statutes in Private and Public Education, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 531
(1999). 1 am unaware of any cases discussing student religious speech claims under state RFRA
laws, and in any event the constitutional reasons I provide for the failure of free speech hybrids in
Part III E below also explain why state RFRA's should not be read to privilege religious over
secular student speech. The same point also applies with respect to free exercise provisions in
state constitutions that have been interpreted to provide more protection than the federal Free
Exercise Clause. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 240-41 (Wis. 1996) (rejecting Smith
and retaining a "compelling interest/least restrictive alternative" test for evaluating religious lib-
erty claims under the Wisconsin constitution). Accordingly, I will confine the bulk of my discus-
sion to the hybrid fights doctrine.
86 Bowman, supra note 3, at 194-97.
87 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). The Pierce Court justified its recognition of this right of
parental control by appealing to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), for the proposition
that the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to "establish a home
and bring up children." For ease of reference, I shall sometimes refer to the parental right to direct
the upbringing of children as "the Pierce right." The Supreme Court recognized the Pierce right
as one of substantive due process in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000).
88 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
89 It seems clear that Sherbert-Yoder scrutiny is a more exacting standard of review than
Morse or Fraser would require. Under the Morse and Fraser cases, speech is essentially unpro-
tected once a court makes the threshold determination that the restricted speech advocates illegal
drug use or is lewd, vulgar, or offensive. (One doubts whether much religiously-motivated stu-
dent speech would be governed by these cases in any event.) Sherbert-Yoder scrutiny also seems
more demanding than Hazelwood, which courts apply in the spirit of rational basis review.
It is a closer question whether Sherbert-Yoder scrutiny is more demanding than Tinker. Cf.
Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1187-89 (9th Cir. 2006) (after ruling that anti-
gay T-shirt could be restricted because it invaded the rights of others, the court assumed the exis-
tence of a hybrid fight but found that the speech restriction passed Sherbert-Yoder scrutiny be-
cause of the lack of a substantial burden on the plaintiff's religious exercise and because the
school had a compelling interest in protecting the rights of other students and in maintaining a
healthy learning environment), cert. granted, judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions
to dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). The answer would depend in part on whether avoid-
ing material and substantial disruptions of the school environment and invasions of the rights of
others should count as compelling interests under Sherbert and Yoder. My hunch is that many
courts would agree with Harper that they should, but the question of how courts decide whether
interests are "compelling" is mysterious enough to make any predictions hazardous. See Richard
Fallon, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1321-25 (2007) (canvassing problems in
the Supreme Court's treatment of compelling interests and noting that the Court's approach to
identifying such interests is sometimes "astonishingly casual").
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the possibility that sometimes religious speech might be more protected than
analogous secular speech. This could occur in a number of different ways.
To take a somewhat fanciful example drawing on Professor Bowman's
T-shirt theme, imagine that a school sponsors a T-shirt design contest and de-
clares that entries will be hung in the hallways of the school for a week, then
displayed at a school assembly where a winner will be declared. Two students
enter T-shirt designs featuring anti-gay messages. 90 One shirt declares that
"Homosexuality is Shameful. 'Romans 1:27," '91 another tells students to "Be
Happy, Not Gay. 92 The latter shirt also bears what appear to be symbols of a
certain ideal of masculinity: perhaps a football, a hunting cap, a can of beer, and
a Lazy Boy recliner. As I have imagined them, the first shirt expresses relig-
iously-motivated disapproval of homosexuality; the second expresses adherence
to a set of masculine gender norms and disapproval of gay men as violating
those norms-an entirely secular viewpoint. Many schools would not wish to
display these designs, and would seek to exclude them from the hallway display
and the subsequent assembly. Would the religious and secular anti-gay shirts
enjoy different degrees of First Amendment protection?
Viewing this question through the lens of student speech law, most
courts would see the display of the T-shirt design entries in the hallway and at
the assembly as school-sponsored speech governed by Hazelwood.93 The ques-
90 Assume that the terms of the "design contest" are sufficiently broad that neither of the shirts
can simply be treated as in violation of contest rules. Labels like "pro-gay" and "anti-gay" are
obviously crude, and they elide various possible distinctions: e.g., between those who advocate
"tolerance" for gays and lesbians and those who seek full cultural and legal equality for gays and
lesbians on the pro-gay side, and between distaste for homosexual people and disapproval of
homosexual conduct ("Love the sinner, hate the sin") on the anti-gay side. But cf Harper, 445
F.3d at 1181 ("Perhaps our dissenting colleague believes that one can condemn homosexuality
without condemning homosexuals. If so, he is wrong."). Nonetheless, the crudeness of the labels
is true to the ways in which these sorts of conflicts seem to be experienced by participants in the
public school culture wars, and perhaps that is reason enough to use them.
91 This was part of the inscription on the shirt in Harper, 445 F.3d at 1171.
92 This was the inscription on the shirt in Zamecnik ex rel. Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie School
District No. 204, No. 07 C 1586, 2007 WL 1141597, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2007).
93 When displayed in the hallway and (even more clearly) at the school assembly, the T-shirts
could reasonably be perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school. Cf. Peck v Baldwinsville
Cent. Sch. Dist., 462 F.3d 617, 622, 628 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying Hazelwood to a school's refusal
to permit the display of a kindergartner's poster containing some religious words and images at a
school environmental assembly); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208,
1210-11, 1214 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (applying Hazelwood to dispute involving proselytizing murals
painted by students on plywood panels that cordoned off areas of the school that were undergoing
construction). In Bannon, I should note, the painted panels could have been in place for as long as
four years, id. at 1210, and so the length of the display makes them more clearly school-sponsored
than in my hypothetical.
The counterargument here would be that the school has "opened up" a limited public forum
for student speech by sponsoring the contest, and that there is no real risk that anyone would re-
gard the messages on these T-shirts as the school's messages. While the argument has some force,
courts tend to read the scope of Hazelwood pretty broadly. If the school newspaper in Hazelwood
2007]
25
Taylor: Why Student Religious Speech is Speech
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2007
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
tion would then be whether restricting the shirts would be reasonably related to
a legitimate pedagogical purpose. The school could plausibly say that it was
excluding the shirts because it has legitimate pedagogical interests including (a)
disassociating itself from messages it finds distasteful, (b) protecting gay stu-
dents from disrespectful treatment, and (c) teaching participants the values of
respect, civility, and tolerance. Arguments of this sort often prevail. 94  It is
likely (if not inevitable), then, that the First Amendment law of student speech
would allow a school to exclude both shirts from the design contest display. If
we approach the same scenario through the lens of free exercise law, the secular
anti-gay T-shirt design would of course get no free exercise protection. But
what about the religiously motivated shirt? To the extent that both T-shirts are
excluded from the contest because of their anti-gay sentiments, the rule applied
by the school does not target religious speech and so presumably Smith would
apply.
That leaves the question of hybrid rights. The religious T-shirt design
clearly implicates both speech and free exercise concerns. To print a message
on a T-shirt is to engage in conventional speech, and the student who designed
the shirt would presumably understand himself to be offering a kind of religious
had not been opened up as a limited forum for student journalists, I think the same result would
probably be reached on the facts of my hypothetical.
94 Zamecnik is illustrative. There, a student wore a "Be Happy, Not Gay" T-shirt expressing
her religious conviction that homosexuality is wrongful. The court read Seventh Circuit precedent
to require that the school's restriction of the shirt be evaluated under Hazelwood even though the
T-shirt was concededly not school-sponsored speech. 2007 WL 1141597, at *9. It then reasoned
that school officials could prohibit the wearing of the shirt because they "have a legitimate [peda-
gogical] interest in protecting gay students at [their] school from being harmed, both physically
and psychologically." Id. at *11. Cf. Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 1989) (up-
holding school's sanctioning of student for speech mocking an assistant principal at a school
assembly under Hazelwood because "[t]he art of stating one's views without ... unnecessarily
hurting the feelings of others surely has a legitimate place in any high school curriculum").
A counterexample is Hansen v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, 293 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Mich.
2003). There, a federal district court ruled that a school violated a student's free speech rights by
excluding her from a "Homosexuality and Religion" panel during the school's "Diversity Week"
because she wished to say that homosexuality is sinful. The court analyzed the case under Hazel-
wood, and the school proffered legitimate pedagogical concerns including "creating a safe and
supportive environment for gay and lesbian students." Id. at 797. These were found insufficient
because the court read Hazelwood to prohibit viewpoint discrimination and (plausibly) saw the
school's conduct as a clear instance of viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 798-800.
Should any readers prove resistant to my analysis of this hypo, I note that for present pur-
poses all I need is the idea that there are cases where Hazelwood would fail to protect student
religious speech but a free speech/free exercise hybrid might tip the scales in the other direction.
It should not take a great leap of faith to believe that such cases exist. Other questions raised by
the hypothetical that I will largely sidestep are whether a school's exclusion of the T-shirts would
constitute viewpoint discrimination and, if so, whether Hazelwood allows this kind of viewpoint
discrimination. With respect to the first question, much depends on whether one imagines the
other contest entries to include T-shirts bearing messages of support and tolerance for gays and
lesbians. As noted above, supra note 83, there is a considerable literature on the question of
whether Hazelwood allows viewpoint discrimination.
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witness to the wrongness of homosexuality. Both speech and free exercise in-
terests will be implicated in all cases of student religious speech, but that by
itself is not enough to trigger the hybrid rights exception to Smith. In those cir-
cuits that recognize the exception at all, the usual trigger for a hybrid right is to
ask whether the free speech claim is "colorable., 95 Though the term is at the
very least vague,96 the general idea seems to be that a claim is colorable when it
is too weak to prevail but there was at least a pretty good argument that it ought
to have prevailed. It is a claim that loses by a little, not by a lot. Where the
speech claim is "colorable," a free speech/free exercise hybrid is formed and the
resulting claim is analyzed under the Sherbert-Yoder brand of strict scrutiny.
Applying this standard to our hypothetical, is the speech claim regard-
ing the religious T-shirt colorable? I would think so, for I have already noted
that this claim would not be a slam dunk for the school. There are decent argu-
ments that a limited forum has been created, and that the resulting standard of
review might vindicate the claim. 97 There are also decent arguments that the
possibly viewpoint-discriminatory character of the school's action could be a
reason for upholding the speech claim. 98 If my analysis is correct, the exclusion
of the religious T-shirt would be reviewed under Sherbert-Yoder strict scrutiny
while the exclusion of the secular T-shirt would be reviewed under Hazelwood.
95 See, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998).
It has been said that "colorable" is a higher standard than "non-frivolous." Axson-Flynn v. John-
son, 356 F.3d 1277, 1295-96 (10th Cir. 2004).
96 Brownstein, supra note 47, at 189-90, suggests that the "colorable" standard is "unintelligi-
ble" because in other legal contexts, a "colorable claim is only accepted as a basis for reaching a
decision or moving forward before the claim can be fully considered on the merits." To illustrate
the point, the Ninth Circuit has said that for a claim to be colorable, there must be "a 'fair prob-
ability' or a 'likelihood,' but not a certitude, of success on the merits." Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d
1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n., 165 F.3d 692,
703, 707 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc as unripe, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000)). Yet at the
point when a court is considering hybrid rights arguments, there is no likelihood that the claim
will succeed on its own. If it had succeeded, there~would have been no need to invoke the hybrid
rights doctrine.
97 See supra note 93. If the school has indeed opened up a limited public forum, content-based
restrictions on speech falling within the boundaries of the forum would be strictly scrutinized. See
Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that strict scrutiny applies
"[i]f the government excludes a speaker who falls within the class to which a designated [limited]
public forum is made generally available" (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523
U.S. 666, 677 (1998))).
98 See supra note 94 (discussing Hansen). This actually raises a puzzle about how the color-
able standard ought to be applied. It is one thing to argue, e.g., that a speech claim lost but was
colorable because it was a close call under Tinker whether there was enough evidence of substan-
tial and material disruption or violation of the rights of others. Harper ought to be seen as pre-
senting a colorable free speech claim for this reason, though the court only assumed this for pur-
poses of decision and seemed skeptical that the speech claim was truly colorable. Harper v. Po-
way Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, judgment vacated,
case remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). It is less clear
whether a claim about viewpoint discrimination in a Hazelwood case is still colorable after the
court has decided that Hazelwood allows viewpoint discrimination.
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It is not clear that the interests invoked by the school would qualify as compel-
ling, so there is a good chance that the religious anti-gay T-shirt design would
be protected against exclusion while the secular anti-gay shirt design would not
be. 99 At the very least, the restrictions of the two shirts would be treated differ-
ently by being subjected to significantly different standards of review. Either
way, from a speech standpoint this looks like content discrimination in favor of
religious speech. Either way, treating the T-shirt as religious exercise would
add protection over and above that provided by treating it as speech.
The same dynamic could arise in other ways. Imagine two junior high
students who wish to make oral class presentations explaining the basis for their
opinion that "Islam is a terrorist religion." One student is motivated by her own
Christian beliefs and sees the blanket denunciation of Islam as religious witness,
the other operates from a more secular perspective.'t° More clearly than in the
T-shirt example, courts would likely regard any restriction of the presentations
as governed by Hazelwood, which is usually interpreted to cover all speech that
is part of the curriculum whether or not it could reasonably be seen as bearing
the imprimatur of the school. 101 Again, Hazelwood would probably allow the
school to restrict these presentations on the ground that preventing inflammatory
(and ill-informed) student presentations and (depending on the student popula-
tion) avoiding offense to Muslim students are legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns. °2 That is the end of the matter for the secular presentation, but the relig-
99 One might also wonder whether the exclusion of a shirt from a hallway display and assem-
bly would count as a "substantial burden" in the Sherbert-Yoder framework. The substantial
burden requirement and the difficulties of meeting it for religious speech in the schools may be
another reason why the speech paradigm has flourished at the expense of free exercise protection.
See infra notes 134-138 and accompanying text.
100 One might question whether a denunciation of Islam could ever count as "secular speech,"
but I think this is unproblematic. There is no reason why a person with no religious beliefs of her
own could not take a negative view of religion in general or of Islam in particular for entirely
secular reasons. Denunciations of Islam are necessarily speech about religion, but they need not
express a religious point of view or be religiously motivated. Here, as elsewhere, speech about
religion is not the same thing as religious speech. Cf Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 225 (1963) (striking down school prayers and Bible readings but insisting that schools may
still teach about religion in an objective manner); GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 80-81 (arguing
that "public schools should not teach that particular religious propositions are true or false, sound
or unsound" but that schools may teach about religion and "should say more about religion than
they now do" even though teaching about religion "is not constitutionally required").
101 See supra note 16.
102 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (stating that a school
must be able to disassociate itself from speech that is "inadequately researched" or "biased or
prejudiced"); supra note 94 (discussing decisions in Zamecnik and Poling which recognize the
avoidance of offense to others as a legitimate pedagogical concern). As in all cases of this sort, it
can certainly be argued that allowing students to make these kinds of inflammatory presentations
and then subjecting the presentations to critical scrutiny by class and teacher would be more edu-
cationally valuable because it would better prepare the students for their participation as adults in
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public discussion. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964). Rightly or wrongly, Hazelwood treats the question of how to handle these sorts
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iously motivated presentation might receive greater protection via a free
speech/free exercise hybrid.'03
Or, to give a third example, consider school uniform policies and dress
codes. These have been routinely upheld by courts' °4 even on the understanding
that a student's choice of attire counts as symbolic speech. 0 5 If a student's
choice of clothing is symbolic speech, the school's uniform policy is evaluated
under the relatively lenient scrutiny of United States v. 0 rien'
0 6 and upheld. 107
But what of the student who has religious reasons for not wishing to wear
school uniforms? This might in theory give rise to a free speech/free exercise
hybrid that would entitle the religious objector to a more stringent standard of
review than the secular student.10
8
of situations as a strategic choice to be made by teachers and other school officials rather than as a
constitutional mandate.
103 The speech argument in this hypothetical case strikes me as weaker than in the previous
example, and so as less likely to be found "colorable." And, again, the question of substantial
burden would raise difficulties. Nevertheless, the prospect that restrictions on two instances of
conventional speech conveying essentially the same message might be subjected to different stan-
dards of review and perhaps even different treatment simply because of the religious or secular
motivation of the speech is troublesome.
104 See, e.g., Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding
school dress code against free speech and other challenges); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch.
Dist., 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001) (same).
105 See, e.g., Blau, 401 F.3d at 389-91 (provisionally treating student clothing choices as speech
for purposes of overbreadth challenge but deciding that plaintiffs desire to wear clothes that
"'look[] nice on [her]'and that 'she feel[s] good in"' did not convey a sufficiently particularized
message to count as speech); Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 285-86 (assuming without deciding that stu-
dent choices about clothing qualify as speech for First Amendment purposes).
106 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien test applies in situations where "speech" and "non-
speech" elements are present in the same conduct, and indicates that the government's interest in
regulating the nonspeech elements justifies incidental burdens on speech where the regulation
satisfies four requirements. The regulation must (1) be "within the constitutional power of the
Government" and (2) must "further[] an important or substantial governmental interest." This
interest must be (3) "unrelated to the suppression of free expression," and (4) the incidental bur-
dens on speech must not be greater than is "essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at
377.
107 See, e.g., Blau, 401 F.3d at 391-92; Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 286.
108 The speech claim here is pretty weak in my view, and probably not "colorable." A federal
district court in North Carolina confronted a religious challenge to a school uniform policy similar
to the one I have imagined. In Hicks ex rel. Hicks v. Halifax County Board of Education, 93 F.
Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999), a student's great-grandmother and legal custodian objected to a
school uniform policy on the ground that it encouraged the kind of conformity that would ill pre-
pare her grandson to stand apart from the anti-Christ during the "last days." Id. at 653. The court
ruled that the uniform policy was neutral and generally applicable under Smith, id. at 656, and
(though the issue was apparently not raised) the policy would also have easily passed muster
under O'Brien. Accordingly, the plaintiff relied on hybrid rights arguments. Interestingly, the
court rejected (without explanation) the argument for a free speech/free exercise hybrid, id. at
657-58 n.4, but held that the argument for a Yoder-type hybrid of free exercise rights and the
parental right to control a child's upbringing was sufficient to withstand summary judgment. The
court's reasoning about the latter hybrid is unclear and (to my mind) unpersuasive; it did not con-
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These examples are sufficient, I hope, to show that the combination of
the hybrid rights doctrine and the weakened speech protection in the public
school context creates the possibility that religious student speech will receive
greater constitutional protection than secular student speech precisely because
such speech is the exercise of religion as well as speech. This situation, I sug-
gest, gives rise to a small puzzle. We might put it this way: Given the relative
weakness of free speech protection in the school context and the nearly univer-
sal availability of hybrid rights arguments in that context, why is it still the case
that the Free Speech Clause rather than the Free Exercise Clause does the
"heavy lifting" work in protecting student religious expression (as Professor
Bowman and I both agree that it does)?
In fact, the free speech/free exercise hybrid argument (along with hybrid
rights arguments generally)' 9 seems to be making little headway in the courts.
sider whether a parental rights claim would be "colorable," but instead seemed to reason that this
must be a hybrid rights case because the complex of rights at issue was the same as in Yoder and
the plaintiffs had presented a "genuine claim of infringement of a constitutional interest identified
in Smith's hybrid-rights passage" which was "more than a mere allegation." Id. at 662. In any
event, the religious character of the plaintiff's objection to the uniform policy ultimately entitled
the plaintiff to greater constitutional protection than analogous secular plaintiffs because the court
decided to apply Sherbert-Yoder strict scrutiny, a more demanding standard than the intermediate
scrutiny of 0 Brien. See Stone, supra note 42, at 48-52 (arguing that the wording of O'Brien
might suggest a rigorous test but that the test is actually indistinguishable from no scrutiny or
minimal scrutiny). To the extent we think of the choice of clothing as a kind of symbolic speech,
this again seems to allow preferential treatment of religious speech in ways that are hard to square
with the general principle that the government may not discriminate on the basis of speech's con-
tent. Admittedly, this sort of preference seems less troubling here than with respect to more con-
ventional speech activities because the mere desire to wear, say, green cargo pants when the
school requires tan or blue khakis does not have much expressive content. But if we imagine
students who object to the uniform policy because they want to wear shirts adorned with textual
messages, we are back in the realm of conventional expression and the idea that religious speech
might get better treatment seems more clearly problematic.
109 See generally Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a "Rule" Doesn t Rule: The Failure of
the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith "Hybrid Rights Exception," 108 PENN ST. L. REv.
573, 574 (2003) (concluding that "hybrid rights claims have overwhelmingly failed to succeed").
As of 2003, Aden and Strang identified only five cases where a hybrid rights argument had pre-
vailed. Id. at 595-98. Commentators may count "wins" in this context in different ways. Aden
and Strang appear to include as "wins" cases where the court entered a final judgment for the
plaintiffs, granted a preliminary injunction, or at least denied a defense motion for summary
judgment. Yet even in some of the cases they identify as hybrid rights "wins," the court's hybrid-
rights reasoning was superfluous because the case had already been decided on other grounds and
hence the hybrid rights argument did no independent work. See infra note Ill (discussing two
cases that followed this pattern); see also William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the
Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REv.
211, 242-43 (1998) (concluding-a bit too strongly, in my view-that "when a court allows a
hybrid to 'win' by applying strict scrutiny to the claim, it never does so as the primary basis for
the decision"). Another ambiguity in this area is that some commentators-as in the Esser pas-
sage just quoted-appear to identify a hybrid-nights "win" if the plaintiff convinces the court to
apply heightened scrutiny regardless of the ultimate disposition of the claim. Regardless of the
details of how hybrid "wins" are counted, Aden's and Strang's general conclusion that hybrid
rights claims usually lose seems uncontroversial.
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Plaintiffs sometimes fail even to raise it,110 and when they do so it often fails.'''
When it does succeed, the hybrid rights argument often turns out to be unneces-
110 See Bowman, supra note 3, at 196 n.31.
II See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 85 P.3d 67 (2004) (rejecting
free speech hybrid because the speech claim was meritless where a church-affiliated employer
challenged state law requiring employers who provided health insurance for their employees to
include coverage for prescription contraceptives); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 F.
Supp. 2d 681, 706 n.10 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (rejecting free speech hybrid challenge to school uni-
form policy on the ground that uniform policy did not implicate speech interests), aff'd, 268 F.3d
275 (5th Cir. 2001). The plaintiffs in Littlefield abandoned their hybrid rights argument on appeal.
Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 293 n.27.
In fairness, I should note that the "success rate" for hybrid claims in the public schools has
actually been higher than in other contexts. Perhaps this is not surprising since Yoder was a case
about schooling and thus its explicit preservation in the wake of Smith may give hybrid rights
arguments somewhat greater legitimacy in the schools than elsewhere. Cf Peterson v. Minidoka
County Sch. Dist. No. 331, 118 F.3d 1351, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1997) (where principal was reas-
signed to teaching position after saying he was considering homeschooling his kids for religious
reasons, Judge Noonan's lead opinion applied strict scrutiny to a free exercise claim on the basis
of close analogy to Yoder without bothering to mention Smith or the idea of hybrid rights).
At least three federal district courts have relied on hybrid rights reasoning to rule in favor of
students challenging public school regulations governing student dress and grooming, and in
addition a state court has relied on hybrid rights to uphold a religious homeschooler's challenge to
a state teacher certification requirement. These cases make up four of the five hybrid rights cases
identified as winners by Aden and Strang, supra note 109, at 595-98. Two of these decisions
involve free speech hybrid claims.
In Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. Trustees of the Big Sandy Independent School
District, 817 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Tex. 1993), remanded per curiam for reconsideration in light of
RFRA by 20 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 1994), the court granted a preliminary injunction that prevented
the school's enforcement of a policy limiting the hair length of male students against Native
American students who believed that wearing their hair long had spiritual significance. The court
ruled in favor of the students on their free exercise claim after applying strict scrutiny because
they had "alleged a hybrid claim of free exercise, free speech, due process [i.e. the Pierce right],
and equal protection rights." Id. at 1332. Yet because the court also concluded (implausibly, in
my view) that the students were likely to succeed on their independent free speech and Pierce
claims, id. at 1333-34, the hybrid rights portion of the opinion was not strictly necessary to the
result. In any event, the court's analysis was extraordinarily sympathetic to the plaintiffs and is
questionable at many points. On the speech claim, for example, the court made no serious inquiry
into whether long hair could qualify as speech under Spence, and it then evaluated the restriction
of this "speech" under Tinker without considering whether 0 Brien might have been the more
appropriate standard. Id. at 1333-34. It is difficult to see this decision as based on anything other
than hostility to Smith, which is manifest in the opinion. See id. at 1330-32. That hostility is
understandable in light of the facts of the case, for the school's interests in the hair length policy
seem relatively trivial and one is left with the sense that its intransigence must reflect an unappeal-
ing lack of empathy with the students' religiosity. Cf EISGRUBER & SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
supra note 49, at 89 (suggesting that failure to accommodate religious practices signals an uncon-
stitutional failure of equal regard when it can be said that government officials would have offered
an accommodation if "the officials had anticipated the impact of the regulations on the life plans
of these claimants and ... they were disposed to treat the religious commandments of unfamiliar
faiths as giving rise to deep and worthy personal commitments"). On that basis, I can see why
some applaud the Coushatta decision, see Duncan, supra note 67, at 858-59, but I do not think it
can be squared with Smith.
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sary to the decision. 1 2 Why isn't the free speech/free exercise hybrid doing
more work in general, and in student religious speech cases in particular?
In Chalifoux v. New Caney Independent School District, 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997),
the court recognized a free speech/free exercise hybrid right where students wished to wear rosary
necklaces on the outsides of their shirts as a symbol of their Catholic faith. The school had re-
stricted wearing of the rosaries because it had information that they were sometimes used as sym-
bols of gang identification. Though this decision is better reasoned than Coushatta, its hybrid
rights analysis is also unnecessary to the decision because the court found the students' free
speech claim to be viable on its own. Id. at 667.
Needless to say, then, I agree with Professor Bowman that Coushatta and Chalifoux are
"outliers" and that the cases do not portend great future success for hybrid rights arguments.
Bowman, supra note 3, at 196 n.3 1. I would also emphasize that because each case rules that the
religious activity was protected on grounds of the Free Speech Clause alone, these are not cases
where religious "speech" was privileged by virtue of its religious character. The next two cases
involve only the Pierce parental rights/free exercise hybrid.
In Hicks, already discussed supra at note 108, a federal district court ruled in favor of a
religious challenge to a school uniform policy by relying on a Pierce hybrid, but the court's rea-
soning was sketchy. Specifically, the court failed to seriously address the question of whether a
stand-alone Pierce challenge to the policy would have had any force. A court that asked whether
this claim was colorable would likely have concluded that it was not and would therefore have
rejected the hybrid argument, for stand-alone Pierce challenges are typically subjected only to
rational basis review. See, e.g., Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174,
179 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying rational basis review to a claim that school's community service
requirement violated the Pierce right).
The fourth case, People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993), may be the clearest
example of a decision where the hybrid rights exception was critical to the outcome. There, par-
ents who homeschooled their children for religious reasons argued that a state law requiring certi-
fication for all teachers in approved nonpublic schools (including home schools) violated the Free
Exercise Clause as applied to them. The court agreed, applying strict scrutiny after finding that
the case involved a hybrid of free exercise and the Pierce right. Yet, strikingly, on the same day
the court rejected a stand-alone Pierce challenge brought against the certification requirement by
secular homeschoolers. People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106 (Mich. 1993). The court applied
rational basis scrutiny to the Pierce claim on its own, but strict scrutiny to the hybrid free exercise
claim. Dedonge, then, is clearly a case where two losing claims combined to form a winner. As
with Hicks, however, the court did not ask the question of why this losing Pierce claim sufficed to
create a hybrid, and I doubt whether a claim that a teacher certification requirement is without a
rational basis-is not even "rationally related to a legitimate state interest"--should count as
colorable. But see Bennett, 501 N.W.2d at 126 (Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing that the certification requirement was unconstitutional even under rational basis
review). The Deionge court's only support for its decision to apply the hybrid rights exception
was to quote the passage from Smith preserving Yoder. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d at 134-35 (quoting
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881). This apparently implies either (a) that the court thought all attempts to
invoke Pierce and the Free Exercise Clause will generate strict scrutiny or (b) that the case was so
closely analogous to Yoder as to be indistinguishable. Either assumption is questionable.
112 Esser, supra note 109, at 228 (concluding as of 1998 that in every published decision in-
volving a successful free speech hybrid claim, the "free speech claim had a sufficient life of its
own to warrant analysis based upon a compelling interest standard (and even to possibly win an
exemption)"). I am not aware of any case in which a court has clearly treated a free speech/free
exercise hybrid as the sole basis for its decision. But see infra notes 156-160 and accompanying
text (discussing a possible counterexample).
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D. Why Hybrid Claims Usually Fail
There are a number of reasons for this, I think, and many are well
known. Some apply to the hybrid rights doctrine generally, but I want to place
more emphasis here on reasons that are specific to the free speech hybrid. It is
this particular hybrid, of course, that bears directly on my claim that religious
speech is just speech for constitutional purposes.
To begin with the general points, the first and most obvious reason for
the poor track record of hybrid rights claims is that courts are understandably
resistant to an idea that may well be incoherent 13 and that seems most readily
explainable as an ad hoc strategy for preserving precedents inconsistent with the
Smith rule.' 14 Both these points have been made forcefully and repeatedly many
times, and I will not repeat the arguments here. These arguments have led two
113 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the hybrid rights
exception is "ultimately untenable"); Stanley Ingber, Judging Without Judgment: Constitutional
Irrelevancies and the Demise of Dialogue, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1473, 1630 (1994) (stating that
"no explanation is given why two rights, each of which... independently cannot justify an ex-
emption, somehow become empowered by their coupling"); Esser, supra note 109, at 219 (sug-
gesting that the logic of the hybrid rights exception is "two losers equals one winner").
It has been suggested that some of the typical criticisms of the hybrid rights doctrine are
unfair, and that the doctrine does not require courts to add separate losing claims to make a winner
(or at least a possible winner). Michael E. Lechliter, Note, The Free Exercise of Religion and
Public Schools: The Implications of Hybrid Rights on the Religious Upbringing of Children, 103
MICH. L. REV. 2209, 2220-22 (2005). Lechliter contends that we should think of the hybrid rights
doctrine as built on the recognition that constitutional protection ought to be stronger where mul-
tiple constitutional interests overlap, and suggests that the image of a "constitutional Venn dia-
gram allows one to visualize a more powerful First Amendment free exercise case when the
sphere is interconnected with parental rights." Id. at 2221.
The imagery invoked in this analysis is more charitable than the mathematical analogy
(loser + loser = winner) set out above and perhaps even helpful, but at the end of they day I find it
hard to see how courts can completely avoid some sort of inquiry into whether the claim to be
added to free exercise is "colorable." Even if we use the Venn diagram image and think in terms
of spheres of overlapping constitutional interests, the problem remains that if any degree of over-
lap is enough, the hybrid rights exception swallows the Smith rule. But if we look for "substantial
overlap," we are apparently asking how close the add-on right comes to the core of its particular
sphere of constitutional protection; and this, to my mind, is just another way of asking how much
force a claim based on that right would carry on its own. This is what the "colorable" inquiry,
vague as it is, seeks to determine.
114 Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion
Clauses, 1995 SuP. CT. REv. 323, 335 (stating that most scholars assume the hybrid rights excep-
tion in Smith was "a make-weight to 'explain' Yoder"); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free
Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 9 (1990) (stating that the various "exceptions" to Smith including
the hybrid rights exception involve distorted readings of precedent and that "the distortions are
inexplicable unless someone in the majority wishes to preserve these precedents"); Michael
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121




Taylor: Why Student Religious Speech is Speech
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2007
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
circuits to refuse to recognize the hybrid rights exception' 15 and two more to
render it meaningless by requiring that the additional claim be independently
viable. 16
A second reason is that even when the hybrid rights doctrine is taken se-
riously, it is difficult to meet all the conditions for a successful, outcome-
determinative hybrid rights claim. Courts that take the doctrine seriously most
commonly require that the claim to be added to free exercise be "colorable."
1 7
A claim that is too weak will not trigger strict scrutiny under the hybrid rights
doctrine, but a claim that is too strong becomes independently viable and thus
succeeds on its own merits without any help from its free exercise partner. This
window of "close, but no cigar" claims seems to be fairly small. Where hybrid
claims "succeed," often the add-on claim is found to justify relief by itself and
the actual hybrid is just window dressing." 8 At the other end of the spectrum,
courts regularly reject hybrid rights arguments on the ground that the add-on
claim was too weak to create a hybrid deserving of strict scrutiny." 9 And even
once a claim has been found colorable, the Sherbert-Yoder brand of strict scru-
tiny hardly guarantees a plaintiff's victory. Claims can fail because plaintiffs
are unable to prove that their religious practices have been substantially bur-
dened. 20 In addition, courts have long been more willing to find a compelling
interest and narrowly tailored means in religious exemption cases than in other
115 Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the
Ohio State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
116 Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer
Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995). I say the approach of the First and D.C. Circuits
renders the exception meaningless because if the claim to be hybridized must be strong enough to
succeed on its own, the hybrid is doing no work.
117 As noted above, there are decisions where the hybrid rights exception appears to do real
work yet is applied without serious attention to the strength of the add-on right. See supra note
111 (discussing Hicks and DeJonge). When courts run headlong towards hybrid rights in this
manner, they signal not their commitment to the hybrid rights doctrine as law but their seriousness
in evading (what they regard as) the pernicious effects of Smith.
118 As noted above, see supra note 112, courts will sometimes recognize a valid hybrid claim in
addition to holding that, e.g., a speech claim is viable on its own. In such cases, the hybrid rights
argument does no work and the real source of constitutional protection is solely in the Free Speech
Clause.
119 Aden & Strang, supra note 109, at 598-93, 594 n.194 (discussing and listing cases where
hybrid rights arguments were rejected, nearly always because the add-on claim was too weak).
120 See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1188 (9th Cir. 2006) (reject-
ing free speech/free exercise hybrid partly on the ground that school's prohibition of anti-gay T-
shirt was not a substantial burden on the student's religious exercise), cert. granted, judgment
vacated, case remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007); Smith v.
Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 928-29 (Cal. 1996) (plurality opinion) (con-
cluding-implausibly, in my view-that laws against marital status discrimination impose no
substantial burden on landlords whose religious convictions preclude renting to unmarried couples
because the landlords could simply choose another line of business). For the leading discussion of
the substantial burden inquiry, see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on
the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REv. 933 (1989).
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contexts.12  This has not changed when strict scrutiny is applied to hybrid
rights. 122
The general points made so far about the failings of hybrid rights argu-
ments are familiar enough. I now want to emphasize some difficulties that are
distinctive to free speech hybrids and that are perhaps a little less familiar.
First, I think the idea of a free speech hybrid is less textually motivated
than, e.g., hybrids based on the Pierce right. This may seem an odd claim, since
Smith explicitly mentions freedom of speech and press, parental rights to direct
the upbringing of children, and freedom of association as examples of rights
which might act in conjunction with free exercise rights to require a religious
exemption from neutral and generally applicable laws. 123 What I mean is this:
The hybrid rights doctrine, such as it is, is born of an attempt to square the hold-
ing and reasoning of Smith with the fact that Smith did not overrule certain ear-
lier cases that at least seemed to grant religious exemptions from neutral and
generally applicable laws. Courts that apply the doctrine do so because they
need to have some kind of explanation of why these cases are still good law.
From that perspective, Yoder is the most "textually motivated" hybrid case be-
cause its survival cannot be explained in any other way. It cannot be a straight
free exercise case because that would make it plainly inconsistent with Smith.
The compulsory education law in Yoder was as "neutral and generally applica-
ble" as a law can be, 124 and Smith is quite clear in saying that the Court had
121 EISGRUBER & SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 49, at 12-13, 39-45, suggest that the
watered-down strict scrutiny applied by the Court under Sherbert and Yoder was an implicit rec-
ognition that applying genuine strict scrutiny to religious exemption claims would be "wildly
impractical." Id. at 41. For an interesting argument that the state must necessarily value its own
interests over those of religious objectors, see Scott C. Idleman, Why the State Must Subordinate
Religion, in LAW & RELIGION: A CRmCAL ANTHOLOGY 175 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000).
122 See, e.g., Harper, 445 F.3d at 1189 (stating that plaintiff's claim failed not only because of
lack of substantial burden, but also because "the School has a compelling interest in providing a
proper educational environment for its students and because its actions were narrowly tailored to
achieve that end"); Triplett v. Livingston County Bd. of Educ., 967 S.W.2d 25, 32-33 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1997) (assuming the existence of a Pierce/free exercise hybrid but ruling that state had com-
pelling interest in improving the education system that justified the requirement that all students
take an assessment test). Aden and Strang suggest that the most likely cause for the lukewarm
reception given to hybrid rights arguments may be "the courts' deeply ingrained reticence to grant
exemptions based on religious claims" rather than "any inherent deficiency in the hybrid rights
doctrine itself." Aden & Strang, supra note 109, at 602-03.
123 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
124 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 & n.2, 220 (1972). I note, however, that the com-
pulsory education law at issue in Yoder did include an exception for any child "exempted for good
cause by the school board of the district in which the child resides." Id. at 207 n.2. Some might
read this as suggesting that Yoder could be explained on the ground that it created a "system of
individualized exemptions." Cf. Duncan, supra note 66, at 1186 (arguing that the reading of
Sherbert v. Verner in the Smith opinion creates a categorical rule that Smith does not apply "when
government adopts an individualized process for allocating governmental burdens or benefits").
After all, it could be said that the law allowed some local school officials to field exemption
claims and to decide that the Yoder family's religious reasons were not a "good cause" for exemp-
tion, just as the unemployment officials in Sherbert had to make a similar determination about
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never granted an exemption from such a law solely on the basis of free exercise
interests.12 5 Nor can Yoder be a straight Pierce parental rights case. For one
thing, the emphasis on the religiosity of the Amish is so pervasive in the opinion
that it is difficult to regard it as superfluous.126 In addition, the Pierce right
alone could not plausibly be read to require the level of scrutiny displayed in the
Yoder opinion. 127 Courts review stand-alone, substantive due process Pierce
challenges to school laws under a rational basis test, 128 and surely the applica-
tion of Wisconsin's compulsory education law to the Amish could not be seen as
failing that test. This leaves the options of either seeing Yoder as resting on a
combination of Pierce and free exercise rights or seeing it as implicitly over-
ruled by a Court that lacked the intellectual integrity to do so openly. Commen-
tators no doubt feel somewhat freer to reach the second conclusion than
judges,12 9 and so it is not surprising that many courts attempt to apply the hybrid
rights doctrine and that they may do so more readily in cases analogous to Yoder
than elsewhere.130 In contrast, I believe the situation is much different with the
Jehovah's Witnesses cases 13 cited in Smith as examples of free speech/free ex-
ercise hybrids. Those cases can readily be interpreted as turning entirely on free
Adell Sherbert's reasons for not accepting new employment. For my purposes here, it is enough
to point out that the Smith Court regarded the law in Yoder as neutral and generally applicable.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. The existence of a good cause exception in Yoder's compulsory education
statute may raise questions about whether the "system of individualized exemptions" exception to
Smith can really be extended outside the unemployment compensation context, but those ques-
tions are best left to another day.
125 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79, 881.
126 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210 ("Broadly speaking, the Old Order Amish religion per-
vades and determines the entire mode of life of its adherents.").
127 The Supreme Court has not clearly defined the standard of review for claims involving the
right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. Justice Thomas suggested strict scrutiny
as the proper standard in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment), but he wrote only for himself.
128 See supra note 111 (making this point in the course of discussing Hicks ex rel. Hicks v.
Halifax County Board of Education, 93 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999)).
129 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
Ci. L. REV. 308, 309 (1991) (stating that the Smith opinion "exhibits only a shallow understand-
ing of free exercise jurisprudence and its use of precedent borders on fiction"). It is remarkable,
however, that the Second and Sixth Circuits have refused to take the hybrid rights doctrine seri-
ously even though without it the Court's treatment of Yoder can only be seen as confused or dis-
honest. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
130 See supra note 111 (discussing Peterson and DeJonge as cases where the court applied strict
scrutiny on the basis of an assertedly close analogy to Yoder); cf also Lechliter, supra note 113, at
2237-40 (arguing that courts should be more aggressive in enforcing the Pierce-free exercise
hybrid). But cf Kyle Still, Comment, Smith's Hybrid Rights Doctrine and the Pierce Right: An
Unintelligent Design, 85 N.C. L. REV. 385, 421 (2006) (stating that the hybrid rights doctrine
"makes little sense on a general scale" and that the Pierce hybrid "makes even less sense").
131 Follett v. Town of McCormick, S.C., 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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speech considerations,1 32 and the results can certainly be justified solely on
speech grounds under current doctrines. They do not need to be seen as true
hybrids in the way that Yoder does, and this provides some reason why courts
should be especially skeptical of free speech hybrid claims.
33
A second reason why speech hybrids may be particularly unlikely to
succeed is that it may sometimes be especially difficult for plaintiffs to prove a
substantial burden on their religious practice in religious speech cases. Here I
draw on an analysis by Geoffrey Stone, who observed (prior to Smith) that the
Supreme Court sometimes granted constitutional exemptions from laws that
incidentally burdened First Amendment rights under the Free Exercise Clause
but almost never granted exemptions under the Free Speech Clause. 134 Stone
argued that this was a function of differences in the ways the Court conceived
the free speech and free exercise fights. According to Stone, the Court con-
ceived (and, I think, still conceives) of free speech rights in a way that "focuses
primarily on the right to communicate effectively rather than on the right to
choose any particular means of communication."' 135 Because laws that inciden-
tally burden free expression usually leave open lots of alternative means of
communication, there is rarely a need for compelled exemptions from such
laws. Incidental burdens on religion are a different matter, as Stone explained:
The Court views the choice [of a particular means of communi-
cation] in the speech context as one made independently by the
speaker. It is a tactical and strategic preference. The Court
views the decision in the religion context differently. It is made
not as a matter of preference, but as a matter of duty to higher
authority. If government requires Amish parents to send their
children to school, it is not frustrating a mere tactical or strate-
132 See Marshall, supra note 53, at 562-65 ("[O]ne may say fairly that the Jehovah's Witnesses
cases established a wall of protection for the dissemination of ideas, of which religious ideas were
just one variety."). But cf Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of Religion After the Fall: The
Case for Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 925, 931-32 (1998) (suggesting that
Cantwell is a "tougher sell" because its language focused on free exercise interests even though
the decision could have been rested solely on speech grounds). The argument that the Jehovah's
Witnesses cases are speech cases received a mild boost from Watchtower Bible and Tract Society
of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), where a nearly unanimous Supreme Court
ruled for Jehovah's Witnesses solely on free speech grounds in their challenge to an ordinance
that restricted door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering.
133 Free speech hybrids do not appear to have influenced case outcomes, see supra note 112,
but it is of course difficult to say whether the line of thought presented in the text is partly respon-
sible for these results.
134 Geoffrey R. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause,
27 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 985, 988 (1986).
135 Id. at 991. It may seem odd to draw upon a pre-Smith article explaining the greater preva-
lence of constitutional exemptions under free exercise law than under free speech law, but once
courts decide that the hybrid rights exception has been triggered, they proceed under Sherbert-
Yoder scrutiny by asking whether the incidental burdens on religious activity are substantial.
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gic preference, but compelling conduct that is incompatible
with religious duty.1
36
There is certainly something to this observation. One could hardly have
said to the plaintiffs in Smith that the criminalization of peyote left them "ample
alternative means of religious expression," for the heart of their claims was that
the ingestion of peyote was a non-fungible and fundamental element of their
religious practice. 137 And where there are few if any alternative means of ex-
pression, it stands to reason that burdens are more likely to be substantial.
Stone's analysis would suggest that to the extent religious speech approximates
conventional nonreligious speech, alternative means of expression will exist and
burdens are less likely to be substantial. At the very least, the point seems perti-
nent in the cases involving controversial religious T-shirts discussed by Profes-
sor Bowman. Even if witness to the wrongness of homosexuality or abortion is
a religious obligation, questions about how, when, and where to do this look to
be as much matters of tactics and strategy for this sort of religious speech as for
analogous secular speech. Where that is so, proving that the restrictions sub-
stantially burden religious freedom probably will not be and should not be
easy. 38
E. Why Free Speech Hybrids Necessarily Fail
So far I have discussed several reasons why hybrid rights arguments in
general, and free speech hybrid arguments in particular, are likely to fail. All I
have said so far is consistent with the claim that the Free Speech Clause is the
workhorse in protecting student religious speech simply because the Free Exer-
cise Clause (both independently and in hybrid contexts) is so weak. I believe,
however, that there are also reasons why the Free Speech Clause must be the
workhorse, reasons why this would be true even if the Free Exercise Clause
136 Id. at 993.
137 This did not matter to the Smith majority, of course, because it reasoned that incidental
burdens on religious exercise simply do not count. If they had counted, the plaintiffs in Smith
surely would have been able to establish a substantial burden on their religious practice. See
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
138 See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1188 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding
that student wishing to wear a T-shirt expressing religious condemnation of homosexuality failed
to show substantial burden because he "remain[ed] free to express his views, whatever their mer-
its, on other occasions and in other places"), cert. granted, judgment vacated, case remanded with
instructions to dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007); Harless v. Darr, 937 F. Supp. 1339, 1346-
47 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (holding that even if evangelism was an "integral part" of a student's faith, the
school's limitation of the student's distribution of religious literature to particular times and places
was not a substantial burden under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA because the student re-
mained "free to distribute tracts on the school premises at designated times and off the school
premises at any time").
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were much stronger than it currently is. These are reasons why student religious
speech should only be protected as speech and not as the exercise of religion.
The essential point, emphasized most extensively by Alan Brownstein'
39
but also by others, 4° is that treating religious speech more favorably than other
kinds of speech looks like impermissible content- or even viewpoint-based dis-
crimination.' 4' The Supreme Court has clearly and repeatedly said that religious
speech should be treated no worse than non-religious speech, 42 and has also
said (if less clearly) that it should be treated no better.143 Brownstein has argued
extensively, and to my mind persuasively, that the best reading of Heffron,'44
Widmar, and Texas Monthly145 requires the conclusion that the law may neither
denigrate nor privilege religious speech in relation to other speech. 146  This
means, for example, that state RFRA's should not be read to require that reli-
gious speech be exempted from otherwise valid, content-neutral speech regula-
tions. 147 To protect a religiously motivated picketer but not a secular one from
the effect of a content-neutral ordinance, or even to apply different standards of
review, would be impermissible content discrimination under the Free Speech
Clause.
139 Brownstein, supra note 47, at 130-38, 164-68; Brownstein, supra note 50, at 612-25.
140 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 129, at 312-13 (suggesting that providing free exercise ex-
emptions for literature distribution by religious groups but allowing state to restrict literature
distribution by secular groups would "offend[] the central Speech Clause principle of content
neutrality"); Thomas C. Berg, Religious Speech in the Workplace: Harassment or Protected
Speech?, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 959, 980-82 & n.73 (1999) (stating that when religious
activity takes the form of speech, the Free Speech Clause's requirement of content-neutrality
should arguably control, but cautioning that this requirement should apply only to "pure religious
speech, like verbal statements or the distribution of literature").
141 The latter characterization is perhaps the more likely one in light of the Supreme Court's
insistence on treating religion as a "viewpoint" rather than a "subject matter" in Rosenberger,
Lamb's Chapel, and Good News Club. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 843 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001);
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993).
142 Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (plurality
opinion) ("Our precedent establishes that private religious speech, far from being a First Amend-
ment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression.");
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (holding that exclusion of students wishing to
"engage in religious worship and discussion" from university buildings was a content-based re-
striction on speech that could only be justified by strict scrutiny).
143 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Professor Volokh agrees that discrimination in
favor of religious speech should be unconstitutional, but remarks that at present the "constitution-
ality under the Free Speech Clause of preferential treatment for religiously motivated speech ...
seems unresolved." Volokh, supra note 55, at 613.
1 Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
145 Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
146 Brownstein, supra note 47, at 612-25; see also Marshall, supra note 53, at 560 ("After Wid-
mar, religious speech is speech-no more, no less.").
147 Brownstein, supra note 47, at 633-34.
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The same analysis should apply, I believe, to cases involving free
speech hybrid rights. 148 A free speech hybrid is only needed in cases where the
free speech claim is too weak to succeed on its own, and this means that secular
speech-speech that is only speech-would not receive constitutional protec-
tion. If a free speech hybrid claim prevails, religious speech is necessarily being
treated more favorably than analogous secular speech. For example, a T-shirt
bearing a religious anti-gay message might be protected when a shirt voicing the
same sentiment from a secular point of view would not be. 149 This is, and ought
to be seen as, unconstitutional content discrimination. 150  For these reasons, I
think Brownstein is correct to say that the "strongest case against the use of a
148 Courts sometimes fail to recognize this. In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th
Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit endorsed the idea that religious speech should be treated neither
better nor worse than secular speech, id. at 1292 n.13, yet was ready to remand a free speech/free
exercise hybrid claim since on the state of the record it could not tell whether that claim would
prove colorable, id. at 1297. The remand proved unnecessary since the court decided that the
defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity on the hybrid rights claim in any event, id.,
but the court should have recognized that any successful free speech hybrid claim would have
treated religious speech more favorably on the basis of its religious content.
149 I should briefly note one complication that receives little attention in my paper: the distinc-
tion between religious speech (i.e. speech that has religious content) and religiously motivated
speech. The T-shirts discussed by Professor Bowman and my hypothetical scenarios involve
speech that is both religious in content and religiously motivated. Preferring speech with religious
content and motivation to analogous secular speech looks like a clear case of content discrimina-
tion. Some religiously motivated speech does not have religious content, however. A T-shirt
reading "Abortion is Murder" might be worn for religious or nonreligious reasons. Brownstein,
supra note 50, at 633-34. Would preferential treatment for speech that is (merely) religiously
motivated constitute content- or viewpoint-based discrimination? Brownstein answers "yes,"
though the question is far from straightforward. Id. at 633-43.
150 Note, too, that the content discrimination here is not a matter of disparate impact. The two
shirts would be treated differently precisely because one is religious and the other is not. Nor can
the content discrimination here potentially be justified under strict scrutiny. As Brownstein ex-
plains, the government cannot claim a compelling interest in compliance with the Free Exercise
Clause, for the post-Smith Free Exercise Clause does not require preferential treatment for reli-
gious exercise. And to the extent the state might cite its interest in promoting a more expansive
conception of free exercise rights than that provided by the Federal Constitution, analogous argu-
ments were found insufficient to state a compelling interest in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
276 (1981). Brownstein, supra note 47, at 165-66. The Supreme Court's decision in Locke v.
Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), does not affect this argument. There, the Court recognized the state
of Washington's interest in promoting greater separation of church and state in its own constitu-
tion than is required by the federal First Amendment as sufficient to justify excluding the plaintiff
Davey from a scholarship program on the ground that he wished to pursue a degree in devotional
theology. It was critical to the decision, however, that the Court applied a relatively deferential
(and only vaguely defined) standard of review to Davey's claim and did not require the state to
show that its Establishment Clause interests were compelling. See id. at 725 ("The State's interest
in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding
places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars."); cf. also Frank S. Ravitch, Locke v.
Davey and the Lose-Lose Scenario: What Davey Could Have Said But Didn't, 40 TULSA L. REV.
255, 258 (2004) (suggesting that Davey "did not hold that the Washington constitution's estab-
lishment clause could effect federal Free Exercise Clause concerns, but rather that there were no
actionable free exercise concerns given the play in the joints in the First Amendment").
[Vol. 110
40
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss1/13
WHY STUDENT RELIGIOUS SPEECH IS SPEECH
hybrid rights analysis involves freedom of speech."' 51 Though no court seems to
have explicitly recognized these problems with free speech hybrids, it may be
that some dim recognition of the constitutional difficulties lurking in the back-
ground is one reason why free speech hybrids have done so little work in the
courts.
If this line of reasoning is correct, it suggests that to the extent religious
activity is treated as speech at all, it must be treated only as speech in the sense
that it should be afforded no greater protection than analogous nonreligious
speech. This idea has the greatest intuitive appeal where the religious speech is
"pure" in the sense that it is not inextricably bound with conduct, prayer, or rit-
ual. In Professor Bowman's T-shirt cases, for example, religious and secular
shirts seem so close to the core of conventional expressive activity and so
analogous to each other that to grant greater protection to a religious shirt would
immediately raise the specter of wrongful content discrimination. 152 But if we
take seriously the principle that religious speech is speech, the consequences can
quickly become rather alarming. All agree that lots of religious activity can be
seen as speech, and courts often seem to go out of their way to characterize it
this way. 153 But if religious speech-whether "pure" conventional speech or
symbolic speech--can be treated no better than secular speech, both judicial and
legislative free exercise exemptions begin to look like unconstitutional discrimi-
nation on the basis of speech content. 154 This would be an ironic result when the
push to characterize religion as speech was prompted by a desire to enhance the
protection of religious liberty, and it is a result few would welcome. 1
55
151 Brownstein, supra note 47, at 192.
152 Cf. id. at 183 (suggesting that religious activities like leafleting or solicitation are so similar
to secular speech that they should be treated as speech rather than as the exercise of religion).
153 See Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses,
41 STAN. L. REv. 233, 242-43 (1989) (noting that the Supreme Court has "often" treated religious
exercise as speech and that the "extent to which nonreligious first amendment guarantees have
pervaded the area of religious exercise is amazing").
154 See Brownstein, supra note 47, at 164-69; see also Berg, supra note 140, at 981 n.73 (ex-
pressing worry that if pushed too far, the ideas that religion is speech and that government must
treat speech in a content-neutral manner could wipe out accommodations for religious conduct);
William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal Protection
and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L. REv. 227, 244-47 (1995) (arguing that where religious
activity can be "fairly characterized as implicating free speech protection," legislative exemptions
for religious activity but not analogous secular activity violate the Free Speech Clause).
155 The Supreme Court's decision in Smith largely rejected the idea of constitutionally com-
pelled exemptions for religious exercise but seemed to welcome legislative accommodations of
religion. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). The
Court's cases involving legislative accommodations of religious practice treat such accommoda-
tions quite favorably, as the Symposium contribution by Professor Esbeck makes clear. Carl H.
Esbeck, When Accommodations for Religion Violate the Establishment Clause: Regularizing the
Supreme Court's Analysis, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 359, 359 (2007) (stating that the Supreme Court
has approached its modern accommodations cases "permissively" and that most legislative ac-
commodations are upheld outside of a "narrow" range forbidden by the Establishment Clause). In
addition, commentators who support Smith also tend to take a more favorable view of legislative
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The stakes here are nicely illustrated by Isaacs ex. rel. Isaacs v Board of
Education of Howard County, Maryland.156 In that case, the school had adopted
a "no hats in class" policy but made exceptions for religious headgear such as
the yarmulke and the Muslim hijab. 157 The plaintiff wished to wear multicol-
ored headwraps to school for the entirely secular reason that she wanted to cele-
brate her cultural heritage as an African-American and a Jamaican.158 The court
assumed that wearing the headwraps could count as speech, but rejected the
plaintiff's claims under United States v. O'Brien.159 In the most interesting part
of the opinion, however, the court briefly addressed the plaintiff's argument that
the religious exceptions to the "no hats" policy undermined its content-
neutrality and thus should have prompted a more searching review. In effect,
the argument was that the school had chosen to treat the religious symbolic
speech of yarmulkes and hijab more favorably than the secular symbolic speech
of her headscarves. While the court brusquely dismissed this argument,1 60 I
believe it cuts rather deeply by raising the possibility that discretionary exemp-
tions involve content discrimination in favor of religious speech.
exemptions for religious practice than of judicially-created exemptions. See, e.g., HAMILTON,
supra note 64, at 295-302 (arguing that legislative accommodations of religion are appropriate if
judged by the legislature to be consistent with the public good); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law
Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1465 (1999) (criticizing constitutionally com-
pelled exemptions but championing RFRA regimes as a compromise that allows courts to have the
first word about religious exemptions but gives legislatures the last word). For a more skeptical
scholarly take on legislative exemptions, see Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment
Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U, PA. L. REv. 555
(1991).
156 40 F. Supp. 2d 335 (D. Md. 1999).
157 Id. at 336.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 336-38.
160 Id. at 338. The court suggested that "it does not automatically run afoul of the Constitution
for the defendants to protect religious speech more strictly than non-religious speech[]" and that if
the wearing of religious headgear is both speech and an exercise of religion, the "student would
have the constitutional protection" of a free speech/free exercise hybrid and that "[t]his fact alone
would provide ample basis" for the decision to exempt religious headgear from the "no hats"
policy. Id. It is difficult to follow the court's reasoning here and to determine whether this rea-
soning should be considered dicta or holding. The court may be suggesting that the exemption
must be permissible because it is probably required under hybrid rights analysis if we assume that
the wearing of religious headgear constitutes symbolic speech. If that is the suggestion and the
suggestion is essential to the opinion, this is the only decision I am aware of that uses a free
speech hybrid to provide preferential treatment to religious speech. It will be obvious from every-
thing written so far that I think this is misguided. To my mind, the only way to justify the
school's policy is to treat the wearing of religious headgear as conduct rather than speech. I
would also add that the court's imagined hybrid rights analysis seems problematic. If we imagine
a student who wished to wear religious headgear challenging an exceptionless "no hats" rule,
Smith dooms the free exercise claim and the speech claim looks like a sure loser under O'Brien
for the reasons given by the Isaacs court. It is not clear to me how we have a colorable speech
claim here, and thus the hybrid argument ought to fail. Intuitively, that would be a harsh result,
but it seems to me the result that follows from Smith.
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Some might respond to this case by saying, "Wearing headscarves and
yarmulkes is just conduct, and there's nothing problematic about protecting reli-
gious conduct more than analogous secular conduct. This happens all the time,
and the accommodation of the religious headgear is in keeping with our best
traditions of religious liberty." Perhaps so, but this reaction only underlines the
importance of deciding when religious activity should be treated as speech and
when it should be treated as the exercise of religion. The push to maximize the
sphere in which religious activity can be seen as speech has implications that
courts have not yet faced, implications which have led Professor Brownstein to
conclude that for the most part the law of religious liberty would fare better by
treating religious activity as religion and only characterizing it as speech "some-
times" and "with caution., 161 If we focus only on judicially-mandated exemp-
tions, the push to treat religious activity as speech may seem to offer only bene-
fits for religious liberty because courts enforce the Free Speech Clause more
vigorously than the Free Exercise Clause. But discretionary legislative and ad-
ministrative exemptions that privilege religious activity over secular activity are
commonplace, 62 and they are threatened when religious activity is treated as
speech. I can see no principled way around this difficulty. If religious activity
of a given sort counts as "speech" when a religious claimant raises First
Amendment arguments in court, it ought also to count as "speech" when the
religious activity is granted a legislative or administrative exemption in prefer-
ence to analogous secular activity. And preference for religious "speech" over
nonreligious speech should violate the Free Speech Clause and perhaps the Es-
tablishment Clause as well. 163 A legislature or executive agency could avoid
161 Brownstein, supra note 47, at 182.
162 See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclas-
tic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1446 (1992) (stating that over 2,000 statutes contain reli-
gious exemptions).
163 Professor Brownstein may read Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), and
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), as suggesting that pref-
erential treatment for religious speech would violate the Establishment Clause as well as the Free
Speech Clause. Brownstein, supra note 50, at 619-24. I say "may read" because it is not entirely
clear whether he means to make only the narrower claim that religious exemptions from content-
neutral speech restrictions violate the Establishment Clause or the broader claim that preferential
treatment for religious speech in any context violates the Establishment Clause. If he is making
the broader claim, I am less confident that preferences for religious speech will always violate the
Establishment Clause. As suggested in Pinette, it would certainly violate the Establishment
Clause if the government gave religious speakers preferential access to a public forum. This
would send a forbidden message of endorsement, Pinette, 515 U.S. at 766, and it would be diffi-
cult to see such preferential access as necessary to "alleviate[] exceptional government-created
burdens on private religious exercise" under Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). Still,
the Court's cases on permissible accommodation certainly contemplate the permissibility of some
preferential treatment for religion, and it is not implausible to believe that under some circum-
stances an accommodation for religious speech might satisfy the standards set out in Cutter and its
predecessors. Id. (holding that the portions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000), relating to prisoners are
permissible accommodations of religion consistent with the Establishment Clause because they
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this problem, of course, by broadening exemptions to include both religious and
secular activity. This might be desirable, 16' but would not be without cost.
Broader exemptions may threaten to undermine a law's effectiveness altogether,
and forcing an all-or-nothing choice in this context might well reduce the over-
all number of exemptions granted.
1 65
alleviate exceptional government burdens on religious exercise, adequately consider the interests
of nonbeneficiaries, and are administered neutrally among different religious faiths). Where reli-
gious speech is concerned, the argument that preferential treatment violates the Free Speech
Clause strikes me as both simpler and more powerful than the Establishment Clause argument and
hence I will focus on the speech argument here. Cf. Marshall, supra note 154, at 247 (suggesting
that where the Free Speech Clause applies, it provides the strongest constitutional challenge to
religion-specific exemptions like those created by the federal RFRA).
164 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 154, at 234 (suggesting that it would be sound policy, if not
plausible statutory construction, to extend the protection of RFRA to matters of nonreligious
conscience). It has also been argued that extending discretionary exemptions to nonreligious
claimants is constitutionally required. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Accommodation and
Equal Liberty, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1007, 1014-20 (2001) (arguing that a constitutional prin-
ciple of equal treatment inherent in the Establishment Clause means that accommodations of
religion are only permitted when the government is willing to extend the accommodation to "simi-
larly situated non-religious claimants"); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 332 (1996) (stating that religious neutrality requires that "the law
should protect nontheists' deeply held conscientious objection to compliance with civil law to the
same extent that it protects the theistically motivated conscientious objection of traditional believ-
ers"). If religion-specific accommodations are per se unconstitutional, the question of their desir-
ability as a policy matter would be moot, of course. Yet even though Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357-58 (1970) (arguing that the Establishment
Clause requires that nonreligious conscientious objectors be treated like the religious objectors
Congress exempted from military service), supports this position to some extent, it seems well-
established under the Supreme Court's subsequent cases that religion-specific accommodations
are often consistent with the Establishment Clause. See Kent Greenawalt, Establishment Clause
Limits on Free Exercise Accommodations, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 343, 344 (2007) (stating that the
Supreme Court has never indicated that religion-specific accommodations are invalid although it
is true that broader accommodations are less vulnerable to challenge under the Establishment
Clause).
165 See Brownstein, supra note 47, at 169 (discussing the argument that extending religious
exemptions to include analogous secular claimants becomes a "poison pill" for exemptions be-
cause it "loads up the pro-exemptions reading of the Clause [or writing of statutes] with liabilities
so severe and costs so great that judges [or legislatures] will no longer buy it" (quoting with modi-
fications Michael Stokes Paulsen, God is Great, Garvey is Good: Making Sense of Religious
Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1597, 1603 (1997))).
Professor Gedicks nicely captures both sides of the argument about religion-specific exemp-
tions in discussing
[t]he dilemma of an exemption regime in a world of broad religious and moral
difference, in which secular commitments have the same moral status as reli-
gious commitments, and in which it is common for individuals to manufacture
their own idiosyncratic religions without the discipline of denominational
boundaries: To avoid inequality and unfairness, exemptions must be extended
beyond the traditional denominations to those with unusual religious beliefs,
as well as to those whose beliefs are based upon secular morality. Yet, to ex-
tend the reach of exemptions so far would seriously undermine the obser-
vance, and thus the effectiveness, of law.
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These points, if taken seriously, present some difficult choices. Treat-
ing religious activity as speech rather than religious exercise may enhance judi-
cial protections for religion in some contexts, but should also place significant
limits on discretionary religion-specific accommodations. To the extent one
believes such accommodations are valuable and appropriate-a conclusion that
appears to be widely if not universally shared166 -this provides good reason for
limiting the extent to which religious activity should be characterized as speech.
Yet I suspect few would be willing to forswear altogether the idea of protecting
religion as speech, especially given the relatively limited protections offered by
current free exercise law.
Some sort of line drawing, then, appears desirable for pragmatic reasons
if we want to allow courts and legislatures some meaningful space in which to
promote religious liberty. Line drawing may also be necessary for constitu-
tional reasons. For example, Professor Brownstein qualifies his cautious take on
the treatment of religious activity as speech by noting that there are situations
when "religious activities are so similar to secular speech activities that they
should be treated as expression.' 67 His examples of such situations include
religious leafleting and door-to-door soliciting,' 68 and it is easy to see the con-
cern here. Whereas the speech embodied in prayer or liturgy has no obvious
secular analogues, these activities are paradigm cases of conventional expres-
sion. 169 A law that allowed religious leafleting but not political leafleting, for
example, would look more like unconstitutional speech discrimination than like
a constitutionally permissible accommodation of religion. There is plenty of
room for disagreement about how to draw the relevant line, but it is difficult to
escape the thought that some religious activity is so speech-like that it must be
treated on equal terms with analogous secular speech.
What seems to follow, then, is a division of the universe of religious ac-
tivity into three spheres: activity that can only be seen as religious exercise
(conduct), activity that may be seen either as religious exercise or as speech, and
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Religious Exemptions, Formal Neutrality,and Lacitg, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 473, 483 (2006).
166 See supra notes 155, 164 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court and
many scholars support discretionary religious exemptions but also noting that some scholars who
support exemptions would require that the exemptions be extended to analogous secular claimants
as well).
167 Brownstein, supra note 47, at 183; see also Stone, supra note 134, at 994-96 (1986) (dis-
cussing the "special embarrassment that exists when free speech and free exercise claims coa-
lesce" and suggesting that the Court's refusal to privilege religious speech in Heffron may have
been a function of "unwillingness to grant a special exemption to religious activity that would not
be granted to essentially identical political activity").
168 Brownstein, supra note 47, at 183.
169 Cf id. at 136 (observing that it would have been appropriate to decide Texas Monthly on
speech grounds because "the publication of ideas in books and periodicals ... is a generic activity
engaged in by secular and religious groups alike for the same essential free speech purpose of
persuading readers of the merits of the beliefs being communicated").
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activity that must be seen as speech. 70 Though I cannot attempt to develop a
full account of such a division here, I suggest that most of the examples of con-
ventionally expressive student religious speech discussed in the case law (in-
cluding Professor Bowman's T-shirts with religious messages) fall in the cate-
gory of religious activity that must be treated as speech. To revert to the hy-
potheticals given above, 71 it is difficult to see the privileging of religious anti-
gay T-shirts over secular ones as anything other than content-based speech dis-
crimination. The same could be said for allowing religious denunciations of
Islam in classroom presentations but not secular denunciations, or allowing reli-
gious literature distribution but not secular literature distribution. In contrast,
matters are more complicated if we compare, e.g., a student wearing a yarmulke
with a student wearing a Chicago Cubs cap.172 It is possible to see both the yar-
mulke and the Cubs cap as conveying messages of identification and affiliation
and thus as speech, yet I suspect few would find it plausible to see a yarmulke as
this and nothing more. Perhaps part of the difference stems from the sense that
wearing a yarmulke is obligatory173 in a way that wearing a Cubs cap or even a
170 It is largely common ground that some religiously motivated conduct cannot reasonably be
seen as speech and hence is outside the protection of the Free Speech Clause. See, e.g., Tushnet,
supra note 47, at 77 (pointing to routine land use decisions by churches as examples of religiously
motivated conduct that could not plausibly be seen as symbolic speech); Marshall, supra note 154,
at 247 (noting that a landlord's religiously motivated refusal to rent to unmarried couples would
probably not be considered speech for First Amendment purposes). Brownstein suggests that
while there is some religious activity that must be treated as speech, a great deal of religious activ-
ity can plausibly be categorized either as speech or as religion. Brownstein, supra note 47, at 121-
23. The bulk of his analysis is devoted to showing that within this sphere of choice, the costs of
treating religion as speech outweigh the benefits. Id. at 146-85.
171 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (sketching T-shirt hypo); notes 100-103 and
accompanying text (sketching class presentation hypo).
172 The actual contrast in Isaacs ex rel. Isaacs v. Board of Education of Howard County, Mary-
land, 40 F. Supp. 2d 335 (D. Md. 1999), between a headwrap reflecting cultural heritage and
religious headgear such as a yarmulke presents a closer case. If the two are treated as speech, it
should be unconstitutional to exempt the yarmulke but not the headwrap from the schools "no hats
in class" policy. Yet, as suggested in the text, I think the wearing of the yarmulke is better con-
ceived as religious exercise than as speech. The case then poses the question of whether the state
may permissibly prefer religious conduct over analogous secular conduct, and (despite lively
scholarly debate on the matter) the case law by and large suggests that it can. See supra note 49
and accompanying text; supra note 164. The question posed by this example may seem sharper
because a symbol of cultural identification (unlike a Cubs caps) might be thought to reflect a
claim of significant strength on the wearer. My colleague Charles DiSalvo, however, has led me
to understand that identification with the Chicago Cubs can also be a very serious business.
173 Questions about the exact parameters of the obligation to wear a yarmulke are disputed
within Jewish law, and I have neither the need nor the competence to go into such matters here. It
is enough to say that for at least some observant Jews the wearing of a yarmulke during the school
day would be experienced as a religious obligation. See Yehuda M. Braunstein, Note, Will Jewish
Prisoners Be Boerne Again? Legislative Responses to City of Boerne v. Flores, 66 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2333, 2337-38 (1998) (stating with citations to the Babylonian Talmud and other sources
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T-shirt with a religious message condemning homosexuality is not. It seems
natural to say that students wishing to express their views about the Cubs or
about homosexuality are free to do so at other times and places. As Stone sug-
gests, the needs of speakers to communicate can usually be met through a vari-
ety of means and a given mode of activity may seem more or less speech-like
depending on the extent to which alternative means of expression would be sat-
isfactory. '74 Where they would not be, speech and religious activity do not seem
to be on all fours.
75
Needless to say, the remarks just offered are only the most minimal ges-
tures in the direction of a theory for determining when religious activity must be
treated as speech and hence must not be preferred to secular speech. Thinking
about whether a given sort of religious activity is more closely analogous to
paradigmatic instances of "speech" or to paradigmatic instances of "religious
exercise" is of some help, but can only take us so far. 17 6 We need doctrinal
tools, but relatively little work has been done to craft an approach that would
help courts draw the appropriate lines. 77 What might seem the most natural
174 See supra notes 134-138 (summarizing Stone's discussion of this point).
175 On the line of reasoning just advanced, the presence of a strong obligation to engage in
expressive conduct often suggests that we are dealing with speech that is not closely analogous to
ordinary secular speech and hence may be treated as religious exercise rather than speech. While
this point casts some light, the case law also contains indications that even obligatory religious
speech that is conventionally expressive may not be privileged over analogous secular speech. In
Heffron, the Krishnas argued that their literature distribution involved an obligatory religious
ritual called Sankirtan, but this did not keep the Court from stating that the ritual character of their
practice gave them no greater rights than nonreligious groups. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 652-53 (1981). Professor Stone suggests two ways of explaining
this result. One possibility is that the Court thought that there was no duty to perform Sankirtan at
any particular place and time, and therefore regarded the challenged regulations as only a minimal
interference with religious obligation. Stone also suggests, however, that even if Sankirtan was
seen as fully obligatory, the Court "may have been loathe to grant a preference to religious activ-
ity that is not granted to essentially identical political activity." Stone, supra note 134, at 995.
176 One limitation in an approach based on paradigm cases is that the Supreme Court's deci-
sions appear to erase most of the distance between the speech and religion paradigms by treating
even core religious activities like worship and prayer as speech. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 265, 269-74 (1981).
177 Eugene Volokh has suggested three possible approaches that courts might use in deciding
when religious activity must be treated as speech and therefore made subject to Speech Clause
restrictions against content discrimination. (His specific proposals are focused on the question of
when religious speech should be excluded from the protection of RFRA statutes, but I think the
ideas are generalizable.) In addition to proposing use of the Spence test, which I discuss below, he
also suggests (1) that courts might treat religion as speech only in relation to laws that facially
govern speech activity, and (2) that courts could determine on a case by case basis whether prefer-
ential treatment of religious speech would be likely to skew public debate. Volokh, supra note 55,
at 615-16. Either of these approaches would suggest that conventional student religious expres-
sion like message-bearing T-shirts should generally be treated as speech. Much (though probably
not all) student religious speech is restricted by school regulations that facially govern speech:
anti-harassment policies, literature distribution policies, and so on. Volokh's first approach would
therefore suggest that religious student speech could not be given preferential treatment under
such policies without violating the Free Speech Clause. Volokh's second approach would also
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approach, applying the Spence test, 1 8 seems problematic in at least two re-
spects. First, the test does not provide predictable answers for many instances
of religious activity 179 and might well treat as speech a sufficiently wide swath
of that activity to call into question substantial numbers of religion-specific leg-
islative exemptions. 80  Second, I believe Professor Post has shown that the
Spence test is poorly suited even for the job of deciding when communicative
conduct may be treated as speech for First Amendment purposes. 18 1 if that is so,
there is little reason to think the test would prove useful in deciding when
speech-like religious activity must be treated solely as speech for First Amend-
ment purposes.
Post's criticisms of Spence may suggest a path toward a more adequate
account of when religious activity must be treated as speech. To briefly summa-
rize, Post suggests that the Spence test fails to state a sufficient condition for the
suggest that at least the sorts of controversial religious speech discussed by Professor Bowman
should be treated as speech. On issues like homosexuality and abortion, preferential treatment of
religious speech would (at least in many communities) significantly skew debate in fairly predict-
able ways.
178 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,410-11 (1974); supra note 46 (describing the test).
179 For example, the question of whether particular religious rituals are sufficiently likely to be
understood as communicating a particularized message to count as speech can be a hard one to
answer. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 75-76 (suggesting that Christian communion would count
as symbolic speech while the ritual use of peyote in Native American religions might not since
any message the latter ritual is meant to convey would likely be missed by the audience).
180 If Widmar teaches that worship is speech, for example, this may suggest that exempting
churches, but not secular associations, from land use regulations violates the Free Speech Clause.
See Brownstein, supra note 47, at 167-68 (suggesting that if religion is treated as speech, the land
use provisions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000), should be seen as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination
in favor of speech by religious institutions). The point that treating religion as speech threatens
religion-specific accommodations is important and, I think, underappreciated. But the point has
limits and does not threaten all religion-specific accommodations. Consider, for example, an
exemption for religious peyote use from a general drug law or an exemption for the consumption
of wine in religious ceremonies from a general law banning alcohol consumption. The law gov-
erning permissive accommodations suggests possible grounds on which such exemptions might be
challenged. Are they denominationally neutral? Do they place undue burdens on nonbeneficiar-
ies (i.e. persons not exempted from the general law)? See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720
(2005). But even if we see the ritual use of wine or peyote as symbolic speech, it is hard to see
these exemptions as unconstitutional preferences for religious speech because (so far as I am
aware) nonreligious uses of peyote and alcohol are not speech at all. One could argue that sin-
gling out religious peyote or wine consumption violates a constitutional ideal of equal liberty in
some more general sense, see Bressman, supra note 164, at 1029 (discussing the hypothetical
question of whether a legislature could exempt religious peyote use without exempting medical
use for the alleviation of suffering), but I do not see how preferring speech to nonspeech could be
said to violate the Free Speech Clause.
181 Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1249, 1252- 55
(1995) (arguing that the Spence test is "transparently and manifestly false" because it fails to
recognize that First Amendment values "do not attach to abstract acts of communication as such,
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classification of human activity as speech because "it locates the essence of con-
stitutionally protected speech exclusively in an abstract triadic relationship
among a speaker's intent, a specific message, and an audience's potential recep-
tion of that message" and fails to appreciate the ways in which social context
determines when instances of communication trigger the protection of the First
Amendment.1 82 Not all intentional communications count as First Amendment
speech.183 To use one of Post's examples, navigation charts for airplanes are
intended to convey messages which will be understood by the relevant audience,
but courts do not treat such charts as speech.184 According to Post, this suggests
that First Amendment speech "presuppose[s] and embod[ies] a certain kind of
relationship between speaker and audience" that could be described as "dialogic
and independent" because it is assumed that the audience will "autonomously
query the[] meaning and authority" of the communication. 85 In contrast, navi-
gation charts "speak[] monologically to their audience," inviting it to "assume a
position of dependence and to rely on them."' 186 Post's general point is that we
must understand the First Amendment's Speech Clause as protecting acts of
communication in the context of some social practices but not others. This in-
sight, I think, might provide a good starting point for thinking about when reli-
gious activity should be treated as speech and when it should be treated as reli-
gious exercise. If communication has First Amendment value by virtue of its
locations in various sets of social practices, it is equally true that activity is seen
as "religious" only within the context of complex social practices and that its
value as an object of First Amendment protection must be understood in the
context of those practices. 87 Perhaps if we can understand why certain social
practices warrant protection as "speech," we can also understand why other
practices warrant protection as "religion."' 88 Reflection along these lines might
182 Id. at 1252.
183 For example, Post points out that no court would consider the prosecution under laws pro-
hibiting the defacement of public property of a person who spray-painted "Down with Clinton" on
a city bus as raising First Amendment issues. Id.
184 Id. at 1254.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 I hope it is obvious that my description of religion as situated within a complex of social
practices is meant to state a bland and obvious truth, not to offer any controversial "reductionist"
account of religion. Religion may be both a social practice and a link to the transcendent. Much
academic writing about religion, including the present article, pays relatively little attention to
"religion" as a category and the ways in which presuppositions about the meaning and nature of
that category may skew analysis. One notable exception here is the work of Winnifred Fallers
Sullivan, who uses her background in the academic study of religion to query the categories of
"religion," "law," and the interactions between them in her books PAYING THE WORDS EXTRA:
RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1994) and THE
IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2005).
188 Admittedly, the latter task seems particularly daunting since there seems to be less agree-
ment about why the Constitution should protect the exercise of religion than about why it should
protect speech. See, e.g, Feldman, supra note 63, at 457 ("[N]o single theoretical justification for
2007]
49
Taylor: Why Student Religious Speech is Speech
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2007
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
yield a better approach than Spence for deciding when religious activity must be
treated as speech.
I say "might yield" advisedly, however, for the project just sketched
could turn out to be a fool's errand. Perhaps the reality is that most religious
activity is always both religion and speech, and that within this sphere of activ-
ity there is simply no way to draw a line between religious activity that should
be treated solely as speech for constitutional purposes and religious activity that
should be protected only as religious practice. Even so, I think the task is worth
undertaking because the other possibilities, though perhaps simpler to imple-
ment, have significant difficulties of their own. To treat all religious activity
that can be understood as speech solely as speech creates significant problems
for many religion-specific legislative exemptions, but to treat no religious activ-
ity as speech is to cast off much of the protection that religion has historically
enjoyed under the First Amendment. The course that may seem most appealing
to some with a "religionist" orientation would be to say that religious activity is
doubly protected by the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause and
that particular religious claims should be analyzed as speech or religion depend-
ing on which classification will yield the greatest level of protection. It may be
that courts and litigants think this way at some level, for the case law is largely
consistent with the idea that religious activity counts as speech when religious
claimants seek relief from judges but counts as the exercise of religion when
legislatures or administrators dispense discretionary religious exemptions. The
case law has rarely shown any awareness of the possibility that speech princi-
ples might cut against exemptions for religious activity. 189 Nonetheless, this
course ultimately strikes me as unprincipled, and perhaps it is for this reason
that it rarely receives explicit defense or even acknowledgment. 190 Given this
range of options and consequences, I think the project of drawing lines that in-
dicate when religion must be treated as speech is worth exploring.
If the task proves completely unworkable, I believe the most defensible
alternative would be an "equal regard" approach that would require all religious
exemptions-legislative or judicial, speech or conduct-to be extended to
the broad protection of religious freedom enjoys the near-universal support that is accorded to the
self-governance rationale for free expression."); Bressman, supra note 164, at 1027-28 (stating
that "[t]here is no consensus for why we protect religious liberty" and providing some representa-
tive citations to the substantial literature exploring the justifications for religious liberty protec-
tion).
189 Following the lead of Justice White's concurrence in Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1
(1989), some courts have seen religion-specific accommodations as violations of the Press Clause
in cases involving tax exemptions for religious publications. See, e.g., Budlong v. Graham, 488 F.
Supp. 2d 1252, 1257-58 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (holding that exemption from sales tax for newspapers
owned and operated by religious institutions and books of holy scripture violated the Press Clause
because it was content discrimination not in the service of a compelling interest). But outside this
context, there is little evidence that courts are considering (or even being asked to consider) the
Speech Clause implications of religion-specific accommodations.
190 See supra note 76.
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analogous secular speech or conduct.' 9' One significant advantage of such an
approach is that it would eliminate the need to decide whether religious activity
is speech or conduct for constitutional purposes, 192 for the need to make that
distinction is driven by the understanding that religious conduct may be privi-
leged over secular alternatives but religious speech may not. The downsides
here are also well-known. It is vigorously disputed whether the First Amend-
ment should be read to require such an approach, 93 and it can also be argued
that as a policy matter the approach would overly limit the willingness of gov-
ernment officials to accommodate religious practice.' 94
These larger questions about the characterization of religious activity as
speech or religious exercise are far too complex to attempt to resolve here, but
they deserve more attention than they usually receive. It is one of the benefits
of Professor Bowman's treatment of the religious T-shirt cases that it provides
an illuminating entry point for these questions. For present purposes, I want to
insist only on the claims that (a) there are some kinds of religious activity that
must be treated as speech, (b) that most instances of conventionally expressive
student religious speech (including the T-shirts discussed by Professor Bow-
man) fall in that category if anything does, and (c) that when religious activity is
treated as speech, preferential treatment of that speech should be seen as uncon-
stitutional content- or viewpoint-based discrimination. If these claims are cor-
rect, constitutional principles actually mandate that the Free Speech Clause
should do the heavy lifting in cases involving conventional forms of student
religious expression like the wearing of T-shirts bearing religious messages. To
provide student religious speech with additional protection because it is also the
exercise of religion would violate the Free Speech Clause. That is why student
religious speech must be protected only as speech.
191 An approach of this kind is broadly consistent with the "equal regard" or "equal liberty"
approach developed in the writings of Eisgruber and Sager listed in note 49 supra. See also Wil-
liam P. Marshall, What is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of
Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 202-05 (2000)
(arguing that general constitutional principle of equality requires that all free exercise exemptions
be extended to analogous nonreligious claimants).
192 Bressman explains that one benefit of her "equal liberty" approach to accommodation,
which requires that religious accommodations be extended to analogous secular claimants, is that
it "avoids the need to distinguish between exemptions for religious speech and those for religious
practice." Bressman, supra note 164, at 1020 n.48. She contrasts her approach with analytical
approaches like the one I have sketched that use speech/conduct classifications to determine
whether religious exemptions ought to be evaluated under "general accommodation principles or
more stringent speech standards." Id.
193 See, e.g, McConnell, supra note 76, at 6-9, 28-38 (arguing that the First Amendment man-
dates special treatment for religion and criticizing approaches that require equal treatment for
religion and nonreligion).
194 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Bowman's paper begins from the proposition that the Free
Speech Clause provides the vast majority of the religious liberty protection that
public school students enjoy today, and raises important questions about the
limits of that protection. I have tried to supplement her analysis by saying more
about why and how the Free Speech Clause has come to be the tail that wags the
Free Exercise dog in the public schools. Many of these reasons are prudential
and depend on the relative weakness of free exercise doctrine compared to
speech doctrine. Yet lurking in the background, I believe, is the constitutional
principle that once one decides to treat religion as speech, it cannot receive pref-
erential treatment in relation to analogous secular speech. This may be one rea-
son why free speech hybrid claims have failed to affect outcomes in student
speech litigation even though the weaker speech standards in the school setting
might suggest that hybrid claims would flourish there. In the end, exploring
cases of religious student speech like the provocative T-shirts discussed by Pro-
fessor Bowman sheds light on the importance of basic questions about the cate-
gorization of religious activity as speech or as the exercise of religion. There
are few easy answers in this area, and global solutions all have significant diffi-
culties.
To treat religious activity entirely as speech is to adopt a flattened con-
ception of religion, and may call into question significant parts of the vast
framework of legislative exemptions viewed so favorably by the Supreme
Court. To treat religious activity entirely as the exercise of religion would be a
tough pill for many to swallow while Smith is still the law, and in any event
there seem to be limited categories of religious activity that are so similar to
conventional speech that they must be treated as speech. This means that diffi-
cult line drawing may be required, and no court or commentator has provided
much of an idea about how this might be done. It is one thing to suggest, as I
have, that T-shirts with religious messages are pure speech while the wearing of
headgear like yarmulkes or hijab is religious conduct. It is another thing to ex-
plain why that should be so, and to create administrable standards for drawing
the proper lines. One can avoid this sort of line-drawing by regarding the Free
Exercise Clause as a "one-way ratchet" so that religious activity characterizable
as speech always receives at least as much protection as the Speech Clause pro-
vides, and sometimes more. This would be an attractive picture to some, but to
my mind it presses the idea of religious liberty as a preferred freedom farther
than it should go. Some religious activity, including most instances of conven-
tional religious expression in the public schools, is so similar to secular speech
that the government may not prefer it to that speech without violating the Free
Speech Clause. The most viable alternative to line drawing would be to extend
the equal treatment principles that must apply to religious speech to all religious
exercise by adopting some version of an equal regard approach. In either case,
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